Lord Triesman: My Lords, some tasks may be even beyond the Foreign Office. Embedded in that, however, there is a significant point. Sometimes diplomats spend not just years but decades abroad, and are not as familiar with the country they represent, whether in terms of language or anything else, as they might be if they were back here a little more often,. One of the points about flexibility is to ensure that those who represent us abroad not only speak languages, but speak authoritatively for our language and culture.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, I declare two distant interests: as a former and extremely satisfied affiliated student of the Diplomatic Service language school some years ago and as the parent of an official currently learning Mandarin at SOAS. Is co-operation with non-profit private-sector providers such as universities, which teach a whole range of foreign languages and which are also often understaffed, taking place?, Given that moves in the NHS to private-sector providers have sometimes cost more than public-service providers, can we be assured that we are looking for cost-effective provision rather than just moving to the private sector?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, in cases processed under detained fast-track arrangements between1 April 2006 and 31 March 2007, 800 appeals were determined, of which 781 were dismissed. The new asylum model became fully operational in March 2007, so meaningful data on decision quality for non-detained routes are not expected to be available before the autumn. Up to 20 per cent of all decisions will be assessed against criteria designed with UNHCR.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, there is at present no consensus among EU partners on the way forward with regard to the constitutional treaty or any new treaty. These issues will be discussed at the European Council in June. It is too early to speculate on the outcome of those discussions. The Government's approach to the discussions wasset out in a Written Ministerial Statement on5 December 2006.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, we must try to ensure that the European Union works efficiently and effectively now that it has 27 member states. That is why my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has spoken about the advantages of an amending treaty process rather than the constitution, which looks, to put it candidly, moribund. The reality is that we must find good ways of working, but I insist, and I believe that the Government will continue to insist, that the outcome, whatever it is, must be seen to be decisively in the interests of the people the United Kingdom as well.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, the Prime Minister made it clear in April that it is not simply a question of the name or the words "constitutional treaty"; it is setting out an approach and giving effect to fundamental changes in the balance of government between the United Kingdom and the European Union, and the constitutional relationship between any member state and the European Union. That would be a fundamental characteristic, and quite different from arrangements—which might be sensible—to make the current27 members work more effectively.

Lord Morris of Handsworth: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the current chaos in Zimbabweis being presented as a struggle against British colonialism? It has also been said that it is a struggle against land redistribution. What plans exist, if any, to assist the resettlement of Zimbabwean citizens who may well be displaced—as we helped the Ugandan citizens to resettle—when Mugabe's vile regime collapses, as it will do?

Lord Avebury: My Lords, regarding the wider picture of intimidation that the noble Lord mentioned in his first Answer, would he consider asking the presidency of the European Union to raise with President Mbeki the recommendation made by Human Rights Watch in its report published today? It describes:
	"systematic abuses against opposition members and civil society activists, as well as the increasingly violent repression of ordinary Zimbabweans in Harare's densely populated suburbs".
	Could not the EU presidency ensure that a copy of this report, and of the resolution which is likely to be passed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union at its meeting this week on the violation of the rights of parliamentarians in Zimbabwe, be placed on the desk of every AU president and Foreign Minister?

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I am a grateful to the noble Lord for bringing back has amendment at this stage. It shows the justification of your Lordship's procedures and that on Third Reading we can make amendments to Bills, having had good debates at each stage.
	The noble Lord said that he amended his amendment to meet government policy. That being the case, on behalf of the Government, I am happy to recommend to the House that the amendment be accepted. I agree with every single word of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill. Contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, said, I took the reference to informality to be the informality used by the paramilitaries in their "Nudge, nudge, wink, wink, we are in charge and you can't do anything about it" form of formality, which we do not like. This is designed to stamp that out.
	We are satisfied with the present protocol. Our present understanding is that it appears to work. There are 16 community-based restorative justice schemes in Northern Ireland; 14 of those are actively in the process of seeking accreditation. There are two minor schemes—minor only in the sense of the number of cases they deal with, which is a handful—and they have not yet expressed interest in seeking accreditation. They have a very low volume of cases.
	We would welcome all such schemes coming forward to seek accreditation. The four Northern Ireland alternatives schemes, as I believe they are known, have expressed an interest in accreditation. The Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice has now inspected each of those schemes and concluded that there are no obstacles to the schemes proceeding to the second stage of accreditation. That has to take place and involves the suitability panel looking at the individual participants. The 10 other community-based restorative justice Ireland schemes have expressed an interest in seeking accreditation and the Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice is preparing to inspect each of those. By and large, that is a big step forward from the past situation.
	In some ways, I do not make any claims about this—the informality of the protocol and the consultation on it have assisted people to have the confidence to put their feet in the water. Parliament is right to put the principles of the protocol in the provision. That is what the amendment basically contains. There are two "shalls" and two "mays" in the four sub-paragraphs, so it is important that this is not locked down over-rigidly. However, it makes the central point that Parliament wants it to. I have to say in respect of all amendments that have not been drafted by parliamentary counsel, who naturally run the rule over these few words to make sure that the commas are in the right place, that if any textual amendments need to be done in the other place, naturally we will consult with the noble Lord, Lord Trimble.
	In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Hilton's question about the breach, schemes that do not meet the protocol's full requirements will be de-accredited and receive no assistance from the statutory sector. In other words, no money comes from these schemes but, once accredited, they can apply to other bona fide organisations. However, no such organisation would be funding any de-accredited scheme. That is the ultimate sanction.
	On that basis, and given that this proposal has received goodwill throughout although it was not added to the Bill, it is another good example of your Lordships' procedures. We have been able to send our goodwill at this stage, with an important process taking place in Northern Ireland, through our unanimous acceptance of this amendment.

Lord Moser: I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 57, 57A, 58, 93 and Clause 11 stand part in the same group. The amendments were tabled by several noble Lords following discussions between us, and I support them all, including those to which my name has not been added formally on the Marshalled List. I understand that the other amendments in the group will not be moved by the noble Lords who tabled them.
	Let me say a few words about the substance of the clause and the associated clauses, which all deal with the release and pre-release of government statistics. They are crucial to the Bill's purposes and to all matters of integrity and public trust. I know from my years in charge of official statistics that hardly anything is more important than getting these rules right and making them acceptable. Let me explain why both the way in which statistics are published and the pre-release are so important. In passing, I must say how pleased I am that the Financial Secretaryhas announced that publication arrangements—the so-called publication hub, a central office—will be set up to cover all national and, I hope, all official statistics. This is not part of the Bill, but it is a very promising development. I imagine that the details will be settled by the new Statistics Board.
	That leaves the key issue of pre-release. That is to say that the key issue is not whether Ministers, advisers and key officials get information about the statistics but whether they get them before publication. If it is felt that they need to get figures ahead of publication, how far ahead should they get them? Obviously, the longer ahead they get them, the greater the danger of leaks and the temptation to cover the statistics with spin of various kinds. This is why it is a sensitive issue.
	The way in which the Bill is drafted to deal with this issue is astonishing. Given that these matters are so obviously central to trust and confidence, which is what the Bill is all about, one might have expected it to deal with them positively and helpfully by making them a central responsibility of the new board and central to the code. In fact, almost the opposite emerges. Although the Bill rightly accepts that there must be strict rules and principles on pre-release, these matters are not regarded as a role for the board and it is suggested that they should be dealt with in secondary legislation subject to affirmative resolution. Also, references are made to what are called "appropriate authorities" for dealing with them. In my view, and this is the key point of all the amendments, these are clearly matters for the board and central to the code.
	Let me say a word about international comparisons. In many key countries, no pre-release of any kind is allowed. I refer, among others, to Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Poland. In more countries, while some pre-release is allowed, it is limited to one or two hours, or maybe three. Another variant is that, in some countries, pre-release is limited to the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister. It is understandable that special arrangements are made for market-sensitive data, but this country is the odd man out. Market-sensitive data are released to a number of people about40 hours in advance. Many other public statistics are released to Ministers and officials five days in advance. In fact, I believe that I am right in saying that more people have more access to more data further ahead than in any other comparable country.
	It is also sadly true that things have slipped a great deal since 2000, when the last reforms were made. Before that, as I know from personal experience, things were tightened up quite a bit. Now they are more lax than anywhere else or than they have ever been before, which I think is harmful not only to the statistical world but also to the Government as a whole. It has been clear throughout the consultation period that this is the issue that is worrying more people than almost any other, so it was good news when the Financial Secretary announced some progress; namely, that non-market-sensitive data that are now available to many people five days ahead will, I believe I am right in saying, be made available only about 40.5 hours ahead. That is a move in the right direction, but not nearly far enough.
	What are my conclusions? I can see the point made by the Royal Statistical Society that there should be no pre-release. Although I rather agree with that, I suspect that it would be a move too far. I would like to see an absolute minimum of availability to Ministers and key officials—something of the order of two or three hours ahead, as in so many key countries, and perhaps an even tighter limit for statistics relating to market-sensitive areas.
	My main conclusion and thus my main recommendation to noble Lords is not to set a particular number of hours or days, because that would be too detailed. My simple recommendation is that this matter—the decisions, rules and principles on pre-release—should be the job of the new board and central to the new statistics code. That is what these amendments have in mind. I repeat that this is central to the board and to the new code. It is in the interests of the Government and not just the statistical forces that this should come about. No other single change would send a clearer signal to the public and users than this. I beg to move.

Lord Jenkin of Roding: The Committee will have listened to the noble Lord, Lord Moser, with huge interest and will respect the enormous experience with which he speaks. I have two amendments in this group. Amendment No. 68 provides that the board must include in the code of practice rules about pre-release in which access is,
	"the minimum necessary to meet the needs of Ministers".
	That presupposes that the Bill will eventually make sure that the board, and not Ministers, take charge of the arrangements covering pre-release.
	Amendment No. 77 deals with the release of statistics generally and gives the board power in the code of practice, which we shall discuss, to include in the rules where the release is to be done, who is to be responsible, and the minimum time gap between release and ministerial or departmental comment on the figures.
	I agree profoundly with the noble Lord, Lord Moser. This group of amendments raises perhapsthe most important single issue surrounding the restoration of public trust in the system; namely, the arrangements for the release of statistics and for pre-release access to statistics. The group also exposes starkly what I can only describe as the cynicism of the Government's present position: that their new Statistics Board, which is intended, in their own words, to distance Ministers from the whole process of statistics, is to be debarred entirely from having anything to do with the pre-release of access to official statistics. Clause 11 of the Bill leaves it to Ministers to make the rules. That is pretty well what happens currently and is what has contributed mightily to the loss of public trust.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Moser, made clear, there are two separate issues: first, the arrangements for the release of statistics generally; and, secondly, pre-release. First, on release generally, at Second Reading I described what all too often happens. In departments, the same press office that handles the release of the statistics also handles the ministerial statement. That statement often quotes selectively from the full statistics so as to put a spin on the figures. The professional commentary is thus obscured by the ministerial spin, and it is the spin that tends to dictate the headlines. There is really only one way to describe this process: it is corrupt. By that I mean that the process corrupts the clear messages in the statistics as disseminated by the professional statisticians by obscuring or even distorting them with selective political messages intended to steal the headlines. That is the first thing that has to be changed by amending the Bill to outlaw the process. There are two distinct activities—the professional dissemination and the political comment—and they need to be kept quite separate.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Moser, said, Ministers have some awareness of the problems created by the present process, as can be seen in their reference to what they have called the hub for the release of statistics. That seems to suggest that there is some process in mind that may go some way to deal with the problems. But we have been told absolutely nothing about how that hub is supposed to work, how it is to operate, who will be in charge, and how it will be policed. More important, will it separate dissemination from comment? It is all very well to say—and the noble Lord, Lord Moser, is very generous in his comments about this—that this is a step forward. The noble Lord may know more about it than I do, but I know nothing about how this hub is supposed to work, and I hope that today's debate will give the Minister an opportunity to tell the Committee more about how it will work and to answer some of my questions. Who will be in charge, how will it be policed and will it separate dissemination from comment?
	The other issue is pre-release. The noble Lord, Lord Moser, has dealt with this, and I hope to do so quite briefly. The board must be given the clear duty to establish the rules and police the practice. As has been said, the United Kingdom is dramatically out of line with international practice with regard to what statistics are subject to pre-release, who has access and the length of time between pre-release and full dissemination. Again, this is an issue that simply must be put right. The board must be put in charge, the rules must be made clear and the Bill must provide for the proper enforcement of those rules.
	Naming and shaming will not be enough. Government departments have very thick skins. Those who deliberately flout the board's rules must be held to account and reported to the parliamentary Select Committee, where perhaps they can be dealt with firmly.
	I have been told that these proposals have emerged as a result of much argument between the Treasury on the one hand and departmental ministers on the other. I have been told that the Treasury would have likedto have been able to deal with this abuse of thesystem but was defeated by an unholy coalitionof Ministers in other departments determined to cling on to the existing pre-release arrangements. Presumably these people hoped that that would preserve what they see as the political advantage that the current arrangements give them because of the opportunity to interpret the figures as I have described. Do they not realise the grave damage that is done to public trust by that process? Will not the consequence of clinging to the existing policies be simply to prolong or even deepen the public's mistrust in the system? The Committee must deal with that along the lines so eloquently laid out a few moments ago by the noble Lord, Lord Moser. We should support his Amendment No. 42 and the other relevant amendments that he outlined at the beginning of his speech. This is perhaps the most important issue that we will deal with on the Bill, and we have to get it right.

Lord Newby: I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Moser and Lord Jenkin, that this group of amendments is probably the most important of all the amendments that we are debating in ensuring that the Statistics Board has the best chance of enhancing public trust in official and national statistics and demonstrating its independence.
	As Members of the Committee pointed out, we are dealing here both with release and pre-release aspects of statistics. On the release arrangements, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, that it is very good that a hub is promised. "Hub" is an interesting word which can mean a lot of things, and I am absolutely sure that the Minister will explain them when he replies to this group of amendments. I assume that the hub will be based in the Cabinet Office. Given the amendments that we passed last week, that is appropriate. We look forward to hearing from the noble Lord exactly how the hub will work.
	Whatever the details of that, I am less worried about it than the issue of pre-release. I think all Members of the Committee agree that the existing arrangements are unacceptable. It is quite extraordinary how far away we are from international best practice in this area. The way in which the Government have sought to argue that having a new norm of 40.5 hours is somehow a huge concession is completely ridiculous. Leaving aside that fact, what is so special about40.5 hours? It gives a spurious accuracy to a huge degree of ministerial discretion. The figure 40.5 gives the impression that there might be a rationale for it, but there is no rationale. If it were 40.75, it might be even better, but 40.5 suggests that there is something hugely significant about this period, which is clearly nonsense.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, pointed out, we have tabled a number of amendments looking at ways of dealing with this issue. The ones that we wish to support today give the power to decide to the board. We have also tabled an amendment that would limit the period to two hours, as we were trying to tease out what made best sense. However, we are persuaded that different statistics may have different requirements. Giving the responsibility to the board enhances its power and credibility. Therefore, we do not propose to move the amendment that limits the period to two hours.
	The noble Lord, Lord Moser, set out the amendments that we support. I urge all Members of the Committee to support them too.

Baroness Noakes: My Lords, our names are added to several of the amendments in this group, and I support what the noble Lord, Lord Moser, said about the core group of Amendments Nos. 42, 57, 57A, 58, 93 and Clause 11 standing part. We also have in this group Amendments Nos. 90 and 92, which we shall not be moving. They propose the publication of the names of the people who were granted access and the terms of the access. We commend that to the Minister as a good idea, whatever happens with this group of amendments, and we hope that he will respond to it.
	Amendment No. 42 introduces a function of the board to monitor arrangements for release and pre-release. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the board will be setting the rules under the amendments via the code of practice, but it also needs to monitor how it will work out in practice and include that in its annual report. Doubtless, the Minister will argue that the Bill does not give the Government the power to set new rules but Parliament will make those decisions by approving a statutory instrument. The Minister will know that we regard that as a mere fig-leaf. The Government will customarily get their statutory instruments through, and they will certainly have control over whether any alterations are made to the rules once they are set by statutory instrument. It simply does not meet the public interest of ensuring that statistics are free from government spin.
	To reiterate points made by my noble friend Lord Jenkin and the noble Lord, Lord Newby, about the hub for statistics, that is a very interesting idea about which we have heard almost nothing in detail. Whatever the Minister says today—and I am sure that we will be grateful if he gives us any further information—we believe that the issue of release should be in the Bill within the power of the Statistics Board, however persuasive the Minister is about the Government's plans for a new hub.
	Finally, I alluded a moment ago to the issue of changing the rules for pre-release. However they are set up initially, they may not work in practice, and we may find that particular Ministers abuse the pre-release access that they are given, or that too many people are given pre-release access. With a statutory instrument, we would be in the hands of the Government to make changes. Clearly, as the most interested party, it is unlikely that they would make changes. The key issue of giving the board control is that the board has the ability to change the arrangements over time if what is initially set up proves not in practice to provide arrangements that form an important part of restoring trust in statistics. The noble Lord, Lord Moser, my noble friend Lord Jenkin and others have referred to the need for those arrangements to play their important part in restoring trust, which is why we firmly believe that the Statistics Board should be in charge of the arrangements.

Lord Chorley: My Lords, at Second Reading, I deliberately said nothing about the pre-release issue for the simple reason that I did not really know anything about it. I had no experience of it, although clearly from the debate it is rather a murky area. At Second Reading, I was struck by the severe criticisms made by the noble Lords, Lord Jenkin of Roding, Lord Turnbull and Lord Moser, among others. All of them were persons of considerable practical experience whose views were important to me. The language used by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, was even rather colourful for an ex-Permanent Secretary. He said:
	"Clause 11 ... in effect tells the board to keep its nose out ... leaving Ministers to help themselves to as much time as they want".—[Official Report, 26/3/07; col. 1484.]
	I was impressed by the measured way in which the noble Lord, Lord Moser, introduced the series of amendments on pre-release today and perhaps more importantly by the balanced nature of the amendments, which have other names added to them.
	After Second Reading, I did not need much convincing that something along the lines of the amendments was clearly needed. Everything that the noble Lord and others have said this afternoon underlines this as being an important flaw in the Bill. I would have no hesitation in supporting the noble Lord's amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, said that it was the most important group of amendments to the Bill. Given his great experience, I am sure that we should listen carefully to his view.

Lord Davies of Oldham: I understand the noble Lord's point, but I am talking about London. The noble Lord will recognise that it is reasonable that we measure the amount of time for which Ministers should have access to information which they know to be market-sensitive, within the UK framework, against the period which I have indicated.
	I also recognise that there is appreciation of the Government's proposals to address these issues within the framework of a central publication hub. Pressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, indicated that he would like to hear more about it—I shall enlighten the Chamber on government thinking on these changes. I must add that there is consultation on this concept which will relate to the future working of the board. Final development of work in this area will therefore depend on consultation after the chair of the board has been appointed. I therefore cannot be definitive today, but I shall address those questions.
	That pre-release is necessary is recognised in this House, in the other place and by the Treasury Select Committee in its July 2006 report. I am grateful that none of the amendments today, although spoken to in typically forthright terms, denies the principle of pre-release, but the movers of the amendments constructively seek to identify how it could be affected. I emphasise the obvious fact that the principle of pre-release is accepted in a large number of advanced countries, with many statistics available to Ministers in the USA, Canada, Spain, France and so on, the day before publication.
	Pre-release access provides a fundamental safeguard, enabling the Government to consider and plan contingency or mitigation measures, release further clarifying information which might be needed on the basis of a statistical release, and to guard against disproportionate and potentially costly market reactions and currency movements. Governments are ultimately responsible for maintaining economic and financial stability. Pre-release access to data may be necessary to meet this fundamental responsibility. I therefore make no apologies for the Government having set out to emphasise the statistics pre-release structure in the Bill, thereby attracting a considerable range of ideas on how we could tackle it in a different way.
	The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, gave a perspective on how government policy evolves. He is experienced enough to know that it does not fall out of a hat but is the result of considerable discussion within government, particularly over a policy like this which, as he rightly indicates, is of interest to all departments. There has been considerable discussion but I emphasise that the outcome is that agreed by Cabinet as government policy, which is contained within the Bill.
	In line with the devolution settlement, we intend that the devolved Administration will set their own pre-release arrangements for national statistics that are wholly devolved. The basic means—and I note the slightly derisive terms in which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to the parliamentary process—of putting the process within the framework of secondary legislation guarantees parliamentary scrutiny. I understand that these amendments provide for an alternative approach to the issue, but the Government are fully aware that there is parliamentary interest in how these statistics emerge in the process, and that we are guaranteeing parliamentary control in those terms. We guarantee that where the board, in fulfilling its purposes, gives rise to parliamentary anxiety, there will be a framework within which this can be tackled.
	It is not fair to suggest that the Government are shying away from necessary scrutiny of this important part of the arrangements—far from it. We are proposing a real tightening up of the process as compared to current practice where pre-released arrangements agreed by Ministers are contained in a non-statutory protocol; whereas the new arrangements will be subject to full scrutiny.
	We also commit ourselves to establishing a statistical system which can be developed in the light of experience. We will review the whole operation of pre-release after 12 months. If it is the case, as some noble Lords are indicating, that the Bill will not be sufficient to restore and enhance that trust in official statistics—which is the objective of the Government and is shared by all sides of the Chamber—we will revisit these issues in due course.
	I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moser, for his identification of the amendments which light the core of his argument on what needs to be changed in the Bill. I will first of all address those amendments, while recognising that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, tabled amendments which also need to be seriously considered.
	Under Clause 10, the board will already have the ability,
	"to prepare, adopt and publish a Code of Practice".
	Under Clause 12, it will have a duty to assess compliance with that code. The Government fully expect the board to include in its code of practice arrangements for the release of statistics. There is nothing in the Bill to prevent the board from not only monitoring the arrangements for the release of official statistics, but from determining them in the first place—after all, the main thrusts of the amendments relate to the significance of the board in relation to these issues. The Government would expect the board to do that.
	The arrangements for pre-release are different in so far as they may be—and indeed in some cases will be—of special status, agreed by Ministers and approved by Parliament. But even under that provision, Clause 11 states that the pre-release arrangements contained in that order will be considered as part of the code for which the board will have responsibility. We are not therefore devaluing the role of the board with regard to pre-release; we are indicating that the board and its code will have a framework within which it can comment on government practice.

Baroness Noakes: I am grateful to the Ministerfor giving way. I was puzzled by what he just said. Clause 11(1) states:
	"The Code of Practice for National Statistics undersection 10 may not deal with any matter relating to the granting of pre-release access to official statistics".
	I do not think that that is what the Minister said. I think he said completely the reverse and I shall be grateful for his explanation.

Lord Davies of Oldham: We are identifying areas for which Ministers will be responsible and on which the board in its code will seek compliance with regard to statistics. If a practice is adopted which the board finds exceptional and of which it is critical, it will, with its code, have the framework for comment. It will be making a report to Parliament in any case and, as we have indicated, the prime responsibility for parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial action lies inthe secondary legislation. The proponents of the amendments suggest that we substitute the board for ministerial action. I indicate that the Bill envisages ministerial action subject to parliamentary scrutiny with regard to secondary legislation and that the board, with its code of compliance, will, if necessary, comment on practices that are operating.
	The release practices are set out by the board inthe code. The only part reserved for Ministers is on the pre-release arrangements. We therefore have the board identifying the broad structure and Ministers dealing with certain sections of pre-release. Within that framework, the board is not devalued in its role on official and national statistics. A particular area of pre-release is reserved to Ministers, subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Also within the framework, we expect to see the tightening of arrangements. I have already indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that the 40.5 hours' restriction is significant as regards present arrangements. It codifies the existing system and makes a due response to the view expressed in this Chamber that we need closer control over pre-release and I have indicated the basis on which the timescale is to be adopted.
	The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, emphasised his anxieties about certain aspects of the process. Within the framework of the Bill, the Government address the main issue the noble Lord raised at Second Reading, when he emphasised the importance of the pre-release issue. It is sought to keep pre-release to a minimum and within the framework proposed by the Government on these matters.
	Noble Lords raised a number of other points in the debate. The most important was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Moser, and reflected in other speeches, including that of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, which is the concept of the hub. That is also part of the Government's thinking on how we will seek to obtain greater coherence to the pre-release arrangements and guarantee that the structure in this country meets the needs of Ministers with proper responsibility for statistics, and the wider public's concern that this necessary responsibility of Ministers should not be turned into what the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, identified as the possibility of spin by Ministers, which therefore affects the acceptance of statistics when they enter the public domain.
	The key proposal is that the hub will be the separation of policy commentary from statistical commentary and release. Therefore, it will be clear that what are released are the official statistics with proper analysis of their significance, and then separately the policy commentary, which Governments are bound to have and which the nation is bound to be interested in, in response to salient and significant figures. How will that be done in the framework of the hub? The board has the responsibility for overseeing the hub and agreeing how it will operate. We expect, however, that as an executive function, the National Statistician will oversee the day-to-day operation. Indeed, the Financial Secretary has already announced that a key motivation of the hub is that very separation I identified a few moments ago.
	I recognise that the hub does not appear in the legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, would have sharply pointed that out to me had I not acknowledged the fact. Until the board is established the actual operation of the hub cannot be finalised. It will need extensive discussion on how it will work. It impacts on the role of the board and the relationship of the National Statistician and chairman of the board. I emphasise—the Financial Secretary has already made this quite clear—that it should necessarily be a clear separation between the statistics for which the board is responsible and which are issued, and policy commentary from Ministers. The hub concept would develop that.
	The board will have a crucial role in overseeing compliance with the new pre-release arrangement. Parliament will oversee the general policy on the secondary legislation. The board will have a statutory duty to assess compliance with the new tighter arrangements that we are putting into place and enforcement of the code of practice. We expect that if these new rules are complied with, the board will take an assessment of those statistics. If the board is critical of the way releases have taken place then it could use sanctions, such as identifying the fact that those statistics do not meet national standards. The board would do so in a public report. It would also appear—this would be serious—in the annual report to Parliament, although it would not wait upon it.
	We are emphasising that: first, we have sought to meet the anxieties expressed in the Committee that arrangements should be codified and that the period of pre-release should come down significantly to the limited time that we are proposing of 40.5 hours; secondly, that the board will have responsibility for assessing this process and ensuring compliance with it; and thirdly, that there has to be a distinction between the release of the statistics and the policy commentary on them by Ministers. The Bill is constructed against that background on these pre-release concepts.
	It will, I hope, be recognised that the amendments to which the noble Lord, Lord Moser, spoke first seek to put responsibility solely with the board. The Government's strategy is one which will meet with public approval in terms of guaranteeing that the pre-release period is restricted, that there is proper supervision of that process, and that the board has a crucial role in commenting on the way national statistics are used by policy makers. I hope that the noble Lord will feel able therefore to accept the Government's position and withdraw his amendment.

On Question, Whether the said amendment(No. 42) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 196; Not-Contents, 133.

Lord Howard of Rising: I shall also speak to Amendment No. 148. Amendment No. 45 seeks to ensure that the board has a clear power to draw attention to the misinterpretation of official statistics and can notify the Minister and others responsible of offenders. At present, there is no adequate safeguard against misunderstandings or the misuse of statistics. Clause 8(2) deals only with the production of official statistics and not with their dissemination. Even flawlessly accurate statistics can be misrepresented. Almost all statistics can be presented in a manner that is designed to confuse or to present only one side of an argument. Data can be misinterpreted deliberately or accidentally by a government department or respected media source. Either way, the Statistics Board should be the appropriate authority to be given the responsibility for monitoring and highlighting any concerns so that the appropriate steps can be taken to correct the damage and prevent further mistakes from happening in the future. I beg to move.

Lord Jenkin of Roding: I believe that we are also discussing Amendment No. 148, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and his colleague, and of the noble Lord, Lord Moser. That amendment states:
	"The National Statistician may comment publicly on statistical matters including correcting misunderstandings or public commentary based on erroneous interpretation of official statistics".
	That is a duty that the National Statistician should certainly be encouraged to perform, and it is the duty of the board to back up the National Statistician if, as has happened to previous chief statisticians, they are subject to serious criticism by Ministers. If Ministers quote selectively from statistics and thus distort the full message that those statistics are intended to convey, it must be for the head of the profession, the National Statistician, to point out that that is misleading the public.
	The noble Lord, Lord Moser, may have views on this, but I can well understand that it would be a brave National Statistician who chooses to take on a senior Minister. Nevertheless, as my noble friend Lord Eccles has just said, if we are going to restore faith, this may need to be done. Further, the knowledge that the National Statistician can say, "Minister, you have actually misled the public with this and we are going to make a statement", and that he is backed by the board on that, would act as a pretty condign disincentive to Ministers who try to fiddle with statistics. While I have not put my name to the amendment, I regard it as important. It would be the head of the profession who would comment professionally on the misuse of statistics. I hope that, in his reply, the Minister will be able to address himself to that.

Lord Moser: When I was in charge, many years ago, I had no problem publicly in doing what is suggested in the amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Newby, said, if the Minister can reassure us that the amendment is not necessary and that the National Statistician still has this freedom, even encouragement, to comment on misunderstandings, I should be happy.
	My second point relates to what I have just said. The Statistics Commission, which has done an increasingly powerful and important job in recent months and years, is to be abolished. When it was first set up a few years ago, I took the opportunity of saying to Ministers that I hoped that its terms of reference could include the power and encouragement to comment on Ministers as well as on statistical officials. However, that was not accepted. This is an important point for the future role of the board.

Baroness Noakes: Amendment No. 49 would give an additional function to the board. It would add a new clause after Clause 8 requiringthe board to monitor the resources available for the production and publication of official statistics. If the board has any concerns on that, it must report its concerns to the person responsible for the statistics and to the Treasury, and it must publish its report and lay it before Parliament.
	We have already discussed resources for the Statistics Board. The Government did not accept our amendments that would have put resources in the hands of a parliamentary commission. That leaves the Government and, of course, the Treasury in charge of resources. The amendments passed last week, which provide that the Cabinet Office, rather than the Treasury, has residual functions, may assist the Statistics Board's case for resources to be heard in Whitehall, but we know who ultimately controls the purse strings. Whoever sets the level of resources, we believe it important that the board should have a duty to review that resource level and act if it believes that the resources are insufficient. That in turn could generate a debate about the proper level of resources devoted to statistics, which, if the case were well made, could lead to the provision of more resources. There would be no obligation for resources to be provided, but public debate would be encouraged.
	We have not yet discussed the resourcing of official statistics prepared outside the board. Problems could easily arise in other departments as a consequence of the resource squeeze that is applied via departmental expenditure limits. Let us take an example. The board could take the view that the crime statistics produced by the Home Office were deficient, but Home Office statisticians could say that the statistics were the best that they could do with the resources that had been made available to them within the Home Office. The ability of the Statistics Board to report publicly would provide a useful negotiating weapon in getting departments—such as, in my hypothetical example, the Home Office—to ensure that their statistical services were properly resourced. This is not just about making sure that the resources of the Statistics Board are correct; it is about resources right the way across Whitehall.
	I am sure that the Treasury will hate this amendment, because it sees itself as the sole arbiter of resource levels in all government departments, but I hope that the Minister will not be bullied by his officials in this case and that he will recognise that there are real issues here. It is clear that statistics have suffered in the past through resource squeezes, and they will almost certainly do so again, quite possibly as a result of the latest budget settlement. The new clause is a modest counterweight against that. I beg to move.

Lord Jenkin of Roding: In moving AmendmentNo. 52, I will speak also to Amendment No. 60 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, which is grouped with it. Amendment No. 52 would require the board when giving,
	"guidance and advice to persons responsible for official statistics",
	to take account of the two main international statements of principles; namely, the European code and the United Nations fundamental principles.
	In Amendment No. 60, my noble friends have exactly the same objective, but they have linked it to the board's code of practice. The result might be almost exactly the same, but I see some merit in making the requirement explicit and directly binding on the board, which would happen if it comes into Clause 9, but I would not die in a last ditch for that.
	The two primary international codes are the United Nations Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics, which were adopted in 1994 by the UN Statistics Commission, which describes itself as,
	"the highest statistical authority in the world",
	after lengthy international discussion, and the European Statistics Code of Practice, which was aEU Commission recommendation endorsed by EU economic and finance Ministers in November 2005. The EU code, I am advised, explicitly recognises the UN code and is consistent with it. There are other international statistical agreements and principles—I instance the 1993 System of National Accounts—but all such more specific agreements are consistent with the overarching codes.
	My argument for making reference to these well respected international codes in the Bill is that it would leave no doubt in the mind of Parliament, government or the board as to the scope of the ground that is to be regarded as the proper territory of the board. Without such express reference, the board might find itself accused of stepping beyond the remit that Parliament intended or act in fear of such criticism. There is almost nothing in the Bill to indicate the nature of the guidance that the board may give. The two codes give express guidance to the board as to what is legitimately within its remit. That is the purpose of including the reference.
	Equally important, reference in the Bill to the international codes will remind the board to make sure its guidance is consistent with international expectations or to consider fully the consequences of offering advice that might be seen to be at odds with the international consensus. That is important in building the international credibility of the UK statistical service. The noble Lord, Lord Moser, has already told the Committee that other countries do not face the same problem of the falling-away of public trust and are puzzled as to why we suffer it. Therefore, it is important that we should be able to satisfy them that our statistical service has the international credibility that it deserves. Reference to the two codes is important in that regard.
	I shall not go through the international codes in detail—they are lengthy documents—but there is nothing in either of them that need cause anxiety. They are the synthesis of good sense in statistical matters. For instance, Principle 1 of the UN code makes it clear that,
	"official statistics that meet the test of practical utility are to be compiled and made available on an impartial basis by official statistical agencies to honor citizens' entitlement to public information".
	Some people might think that that is a clearer exposition of what the Bill is about than appears in the Bill.
	Principle 6 of the UN code states:
	"Individual data collected by statistical agencies for statistical compilation, whether they refer to natural or legal persons, are to be strictly confidential and used exclusively for statistical purposes".
	That is an international obligation to which this country has subscribed. Individual privacy, which we shall come to discuss, is a matter of concern to many in this Chamber, and it is helpful to have such a clear statement of principle from the UN.
	The UN code has stood the test of time—some14 years have gone by without significant amendment—and the EU code, while newer, has been accepted by all the European statistical offices as the basis of a Europe-wide assessment function carried out under the principles of peer review. The UK statistical service is, I am advised, to be reviewed against the EU code this year. It would be wrong for the Statistics Board to do anything other than work in close partnership with the EU arrangements.
	Amendment No. 52 would expressly import the two conventions into the Bill by requiring that the board take account of those international codes. I beg to move.

Baroness Noakes: Amendment No. 54 has attracted the support of the noble Lords, Lord Moser and Lord Newby. I shall also speak to the other amendments in this group which stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising.
	In Clause 10 and the scope of the code of practice, we encounter another area of the Bill where the Government will fail to achieve the full potential of the new arrangements to restore trust in official statistics. Clause 10 requires the board to prepare a code of practice for national statistics. This is the first time in the Bill that we encounter national statistics as opposed to official statistics, which are referred to elsewhere. We support the existence of the code of practice and pay tribute to the work that the Statistics Commission has done in developing the content of a code.
	What we do not support is the Government picking and choosing which official statistics are to be assessed against the code, leading to designation as national statistics. We believe that the distinction between official and national statistics is unhelpful and confusing to lay users of statistics, and simply that no official statistics should be prepared without regard to the code of practice. Our amendments are slightly different from those in this group tabled by the Liberal Democrats, as theirs have a distinction between official and national statistics, admittedly on the basis of being within the control of the board rather than the control of government.
	Amendment No. 54 changes the title of the code to the "Code of Practice for Official Statistics" in Clause 10(l). There will be no separate national statistics in our scheme for this part of the Bill. Amendments Nos. 78, 80, 81, 82, 84 and 85 amend Clause 12 so that it is not for government departments to choose whether to have their statistics assessed against the code. The board will be required to assess all statistics. Amendments Nos. 87, 88 and 89 make consequential amendments to the reassessment provisions of Clause 13. Lastly, Amendment No. 91 converts the obligation of the board to publish a list of national statistics to one which publishes all official statistics together with a note of when they were assessed and the result of that assessment.
	The Statistics Commission and the Royal Statistical Society oppose the treatment of official and national statistics in this Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, who I see is unfortunately no longer in his place, pointed out at Second Reading:
	"That can only give rise to suspicion, even if unwarranted, that the Government want either to tolerate a Ryman league of second-rate statistics not covered by the code or, worse, that Ministers want to keep certain statistics in the lower league so that they can get away with things that are outside the disciplines of the code".—[Official Report, 26/3/07; col. 1484.]
	I do not know much about football leagues but I know that "second rate" is not consistent with achieving high degrees of public trust. I beg to move.

Lord Jenkin of Roding: The noble Lord, Lord Moser, has put the case cogently and briefly and therefore I do not want to say much. However, I want to remind the Committee that lying behind much of this is the report by Professor Adrian Smith on criminal statistics. In that, he poured considerable doubt on the validity of the various series of criminal statistics which are produced by the Home Office. Under the definitions in the Bill, those are official statistics; they are produced not by the ONS, but by the Home Office. In the light of Professor Smith's comments and criticisms of the handling of that in recent years, I regard it as bizarre that they should be outside the code that the Bill sets up.
	The Minister owes the Committee a considerable explanation of why the Government think that that is right. If you are going to have a code of practice for statistics, it should apply to all statistics, as my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Moser, said. An unreal distinction is being drawn which once again, I suspect, has been included in the Bill at the behest of the departments which want to keep a tighter control over their own statistics. They do not want the board crawling over them too much and they certainly do not want them to be subject tothe board's code of practice. Well, who is in charge? This is a Treasury Bill and, surely to goodness, the Treasury should say to the other departments, "Look, we are all in the same game of trying to restore trust. Now, go away. We're going to have all official statistics under the guidance of the code". If the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not prepared to say that to his colleagues, Lord help us.

Lord Davies of Oldham: I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, that it is desirable thatthe board should hit the ground running. UnderClause 12(1), on day one of the new system, all the statistics designated as national statistics shall be regarded as being designated as national statistics for the new system and automatically subject to assessment by the board. Therefore, there are no problems with the board being able to set about its work immediately.
	I want to reflect on the nature of the code of practice for which the board is responsible and why it is valuable to have the concept of national statistics. Of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Newby, indicated, all statistics start as official statistics and I assure him that we envisage that the board, within its operation, will see the picture changing and statistics becoming of such import, salience and significance that they move from official to national within the operation of the code. Furthermore, we do not look on the code as restrictive. The formal statement of the code is one of practice against which national statistics, or candidate national statistics, will be assessed. As the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, indicated, we expect the board to promote its code of good practice against all official statistics. However, as a special responsibility and obligation is identified with regard to national statistics, I shall seek to explain why I must resist the amendments.
	Why do we make a distinction between official and national statistics? The noble Lord, Lord Moser, asked that excellent question, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who reiterates it now. In a modern statistical system it is most important and practical that the board's independent audit function covers all the statistics that are most relevant to policy formulation, delivery and accountability. Those statistics are the most valuable to business, academia and a wide range of other users.
	Statistics produced and published by the Government differ in importance. Unemployment statistics are important for a wide range of purposes and uses. They are a bit more important than the number of television licences held by a government department. Few would argue that such statistics should all be treated in the same way or have the same status. An active assessment programme will necessarily bring with it resource implications, both in funding the process itself and in placing a compliance burden on those assessed for the code. It is right that we should limit this assessment to the core set of national statistics—the key statistics that government, business and the public rely on for an accurate, up-to-date and comprehensive description of a modern United Kingdom.
	Currently, about 1,300 national statistics cover the vast majority of key statistics on health, education and crime. That set of national statistics is already comparable with our international counterparts. That is not an unimportant factor in terms of issues of international comparison.
	Most of the key national indicators are already national statistics. Some have suggested that national statistics comprise around 80 per cent of all official statistics. That is not the case. The very broad legal definition of official statistics, which we use in the Bill, means that it is not a straightforward task to quantify the volume of official statistics.
	The definition in Clause 9 includes all statistics produced by the Government, their agencies, the devolved Administrations and other Crown bodies. Statistics from other public bodies can also be added to the scope of official statistics. That reflects the Government's desire to ensure a wide coverage and definition of official statistics which is flexible and can capture the wide, evolving and increasing rangeof data produced and used by government. The volume and range is vast and covers all sorts of information.
	The Government have adopted this broad definition, as set out in the Bill, to ensure that the vast range of statistical information produced across government is within the scope of the board's objective. The board is required to promote and safeguard its quality, comprehensiveness and good practice. We believe that we should remain committed to the principle that it is right within the vast category of official statistics that the board's assessment process starts by focusing on those key national statistics on which we all rely, and which, as the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, said, will enable the board to hit the ground running.
	The Bill creates a framework that can evolve in the light of experience and changing demands from data users. It means that inevitably the set of national statistics will evolve. There will be a strong incentive for Ministers to look actively at submitting additional departmental statistics for approval as national statistics where they are central to the policy functions they carry out or to the delivery of programmes for which they are responsible.
	As my honourable friend the Financial Secretary said many times in the other place in its considerations during the passage of the Bill, we also expect the board, as part of its statutory duty, to comment on the comprehensiveness and coverage of official statistics and to comment on any official statistics if it thinks they should become national statistics. That is the process of evolution to which the noble Lord, Lord Newby, drew attention.
	I treat with the greatest respect the position indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Moser, when he suggested that it is difficult to draw the line—as inevitably it is, although we are indicating that the line is an evolving line, to which official statistics get translated into national statistics once a case has been made out for them. Also, he sees no need for such a division. There are implications for resource allocation when the board is doing its job properly and makes comments on departmental work and the adequacy of statistics. There will be resource implications if departments have to respond in order to guarantee that they meet the board's requirement, wherever it occurs, that certain statistics should be brought up to standard. The board should primarily be concerned with the national statistics central to the development of policy formulation in the country.
	Obvious criticisms could be made of any division in these terms, but I ask the Chamber to recognise that we must have some regard to the priorities for the board and its work across the massive range of official statistics which exist. Any line drawn is bound to raise the kind of challenges that the noble Lord, Lord Moser, expressed so forcefully in his contribution, but we are indicating that we are devolving to the board considerable responsibilities and very important powers. The role of the National Statistician is greatly enhanced against the background of the rest of the Bill in terms of how the system works. Within that framework I defend what the Bill already says about the definition of national and official statistics. I recognise the valid points that have been made in this debate, but I am hopeful that noble Lords will see the wisdom of the Government's position and feel able not to press their amendments.

Baroness Noakes: I am not sure that we can discern wisdom in the Government's position. I start by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. They have highlighted the practical areas where illogical distinctions exist at present. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, put the matter rather well when he said that there would be big statistics and little statistics, and that it would be the Government who determined which escape having to comply with the code and thereby become big statistics. The Minister said that it was valuable to have this distinction, but I did not hear him say anything that made it at all valuable to have the distinction between national and official statistics. The Minister made much about the resource implications, not only for the board but also for those needing to comply with the code. I do not think we would have any problem with that.
	The key issue is who should decide the priorities and therefore who should decide what is to be assessed against the code of practice. The Minister's argument is that the Government, through the devolved administrations and government departments, should decide whether or not they want their statistics judged under the terms of the Bill against the code of practice and thereby become big statistics—national statistics. We have argued that it should be for the board to determine that. The board will determine what it does in the light of the resources available to it. It does not have infinite resources and therefore will have to set its priorities.
	The Minister argued, in effect, that departments that do not put enough resources into their statistics should be allowed to carry on putting out ropey statistics. That simply does not stack up. There is a large difference between us on whether it is the Government or the board that calls the shots. The board is being set up to restore trust in official statistics. We do not think that trust will be achieved in the way that the Government have described. We would like to think carefully about what the Minister said but it is fair to put him on notice that it is likely that we will be returning to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Noakes: I can be brief with Amendment No. 55 which is probing. The amendment inserts additional words at the end of Clause 10(1) so that the code of practice required by Clause 10 must be issued within 12 months of the board being established. I am sure that the Minister will agree that the work of restoring trust in our official statistics must begin as soon as possible. In the absence of a code of practice there may be some degree of statistical mayhem, as the Government have the opportunity to manipulate statistics and their release.
	We strongly support the statutory code of practice, but our concern is to ensure that it is available as soon as possible. We know that the Statistics Commission has done good work with its draft code, but it is by no means certain that a new statistics board would pick up that work. We do not know if the Government will use their appointment rights to secure some continuity with the Statistics Commission or will try to make a clean break from a body which they have sometimes found troublesome.
	If there is a clean break ,there is a possibility that the code will be delayed. The code should be operational within weeks of the new arrangements coming into effect. However, we have allowed 12 months, to allow some leeway, from the time that the Statistics Board is established. I hope that the Government will share our desire that the code should get out and be available early in the life of the Statistics Board. I hope that the Minister will set out how and when the Government expect the new code to be issued. I beg to move.

Lord Jenkin of Roding: In relation to this amendment, it is interesting to remind ourselves what the chairman of the Statistics Commission wrote in his letter of 8 December when he sent copies of the draft code of practice as an interim report for consultation. He wrote:
	"Although the new Board is unlikely to be in a position to take decisions on the Code until late in 2007 or early 2008, we are seeking comments at this time so as to be able to deliver well-considered public advice in summer 2007".
	He goes on:
	"All the comments we receive will be provided in full to the new Board, along with an updated text of our proposals".
	It is clear that the commission has regarded this as an exercise which has to be taken at a measured pace. It is right that it is consulting on the December draft, but it does not believe that the new board likely to be able to take decisions until early next year—2008. If the code is going to play the important role which the Government have earmarked for it, it is really important, as my noble friend has said, that it should be operative at the earliest possible opportunity. That timetable, which is already long drawn out, should not be delayed more than conceivably necessary.
	An amendment along the lines of that proposed by my noble friend seems highly desirable. We all support the idea of the code. No doubt, when the commission has considered all the representations we shall have another draft to consider but we must get on with it. Otherwise, we are going to have a long delay and we do not want that. In the words of my noble friend Lord Eccles, we will not hit the ground running.

Lord Northbrook: I support the amendment of my noble friend Lady Noakes to carry on the good work of the Statistics Commission. I wonder whether12 months to adopt and publish a code is rather generous and whether that should be reduced to maybe three or six months.

Baroness Noakes: I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate for their contributions. I hadhoped that the Minister would set out in some detail how he saw the timing, the relationship with the current code which is being consulted on by the Statistics Commission and that he would flesh things out, but of fleshing out we got nothing. All we got was that the Minister was aware of the issue's importance.
	I am coming round to my noble friend Lord Northbrook's view that my amendment which gave12 months to issue the code, which was merely a sighting shot for the purpose of debate, is clearly inadequate. A much shorter timetable may wellneed to be put into the Bill because there is no sense of urgency or purpose, or clarity about what is going to happen. I indicated that it was a probing amendment therefore I shall withdraw it. I would like the Minister to reflect on whether the answer that he has given is satisfactory; we will possibly come back to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Noakes: I will also speak to Amendment Nos. 65 and 115. These amendments concern compliance with the code of practice. The Statistics Commission and the Royal Statistical Society believe that the code of practice must be accompanied by an obligation to comply with it. The Bill is silent on this because the Government contemplate that some statistics will not comply with it. In effect, that is the distinction between national and official statistics, or big and little statistics, which we debated earlier. My amendments would ensure that compliance is required.
	Amendment No. 56 amends Clause 10(1) to ensure that the board both prepares the code and monitors compliance, leading to compliance being specifically included in the board's annual report, as set out in Amendment No. 115. Although Clause 12 deals with the assessment of individual statistics against the code, there is nothing in the Bill that mandates the board to oversee compliance. There may be generic issues about compliance as well as specific ones related to particular statistics or statistical series. The duty to monitor compliance complements the assessment provisions in Clause 12.
	Amendments Nos. 56 and 115 shift the public emphasis to compliance with the code, but the real meat is found in Amendment No. 65, which would add a new clause after Clause 10 requiring compliance with the code. The new clause requires compliance by the board, the National Statistician, government departments, the devolved Administrations and anyone else who produces or publishes official statistics. It is important that that obligation applies not just to statistical staff who produce statistics but to government departments and their Ministers.
	That would make it easier for professionals to adhere to the standards that I am sure that they want to attain, because it will be in statute that compliance is obligatory. The amendment also requires consultation with the board on matters of interpretation. I do not understand why the Bill does not emphasise and require compliance. I beg to move.

Lord Newby: We have considerable sympathy with the amendments. Our Amendment No. 64 is in the group. If the earlier amendment about the difference between official and national statistics were carried, our amendment would need amending, but it makes two points. The first is of lesser importance, because it is highly unlikely to arise often. If a department feels that it cannot comply with every aspect of the code for some reason—I do not know what it might be, but in theory that is possible—it should consult the board and the board will be required todeem whether that deviation from the code was acceptable.
	The second point, which would be a valuable addition, is that the amendment places a requirement on departments continually to monitor their compliance with the code and, where they find that theyhave breached the code, to report that breach to the board. At the moment, the board must assess whether departments have complied with the code, but where a department has for some reason not compliedwith the code and discovered that, it should have a statutory responsibility to report that breach to the board.

Lord Davies of Oldham: I am grateful to the two noble Lords who have spoken to their amendments, which are intended to make compliance with the code mandatory. I have emphasised before, but I take this opportunity to emphasise again, that the Government do not believe in over-prescribing in the Bill the requirements on the board, especially when, in respect of Amendment No. 56, the Bill already provides for the board to be responsible for monitoring. That is already in Clauses 12 and 13 and we do not see the need for additional prescription.
	The noble Lord, Lord Newby, made his case, but we do not think that reporting breaches of standards of the code should be set out in legislation. Of course the board, working with all the relevant stakeholders, will develop mechanisms to engage on interpretation of the code and reporting breaches of it, but that is not a matter for legislation. The approach to reporting breaches may well be set out in the code itself—for which, after all, the board will be responsible. The board may choose to continue with something akin to the current requirement that any accidental or wrongful release of statistics must be immediately reported to the National Statistician. If a suspected breach is brought to the board's attention, or if for any reason it becomes concerned about a possible breach, it can carry out an immediate assessment. The board must publicly report its findings. That is all within the framework of the Bill and I do not think that the amendment adds a great deal.

Lord Davies of Oldham: What I am saying is that under the framework of the Bill—the code is still to be evolved—if there is a breach of the terms, the board may state in the code that it needs an immediate report to the National Statistician, which would involve it in taking action. I am asking for it to be respected that we are allowing the board to judge the code that it will produce for its operation, rather than writing into the Bill, as the amendments do, how the board should act. We expect the code of practice to be a model of good practice for official statistics and for the board to promote it as such.
	We had the discussion on a previous amendment about official versus national statistics but all along I have sought to emphasise that the board has responsibility for official statistics. It will seek to bring some statistics within the framework of national statistics when that is merited. The role of the board is to promote the concepts and requirements of the code to cover all statistics. We should not tell the board in detail how to do its job, which is the main thrust behind the amendments. I recognise that they are well intended, because they are directed at objectives for which the board must surely see an obligation. We were earlier asked to ensure that the board moves with dispatch to take responsibility for the operation of its code. I sought to give assurances on that. That does not mean that we would aid the process by being overly prescriptive in legislation, which reduces the flexibility of theboard and, potentially, its competence to get its work done.

Lord Davies of Oldham: I resist amendments that specify in detail the ole of the board, but clearly if the board considers that statistics are not meeting the standards of the code, it can act. The ultimate sanction of the board is obvious enough: it would include in its annual report presented to Parliament any criticism that it had voiced about national statistics produced by anyone. Within that framework, in ensuring compliance with the code of practice for national statistics, the board has clearly both the powers and the obligations under the Bill. We should leave the board to develop the code of practice against those obvious expectations.

Baroness Noakes: moved Amendments Nos. 57to 58:
	Clause 10, page 5, line 13, at end insert—
	"(1A) The Code shall include rules and principles relating to the access to official statistics in their final form prior to publication ("pre-release access"), including—
	(a) the circumstances in which, or descriptions of statistics in relation to which, pre-release access may or may not be granted;(b) the persons, or descriptions of persons, to whom pre-release access may be granted;(c) the period, or maximum period, during which pre-release access may be so granted;(d) the conditions subject to which pre-release access may be granted.
	(1B) The Code may make different provision for different cases."
	Clause 10, page 5, line 13, at end insert—
	"(1C) The rules and principles for pre-release access required by subsection (1A) shall keep such access to the minimum necessary to meet the needs of Ministers."
	Clause 10, page 5, line 13, at end insert—
	"( ) The Code shall include rules and principles relating to the release of official statistics, including—
	(a) the location from which the release of official statistics may be made;(b) the time at which the release of official statistics may be made; and(c) the identification of the person or persons who are responsible for the release of official statistics."
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 59 and 60 not moved.]

Lord Howard of Rising: Amendment No. 61 corrects what can only be assumed to be an oversight by the Government. Clause 10(3) lays out those whom the board must consult in preparing or revising the code of practice. It specifies only the Scottish and Welsh Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel. Why is the Treasury, one of the most prolific producers of official statistics,not included? This clause gives the unfortunate impression that the Treasury will be in such control of the board and have such a close hand in drawing up the code that it will not be necessary to consult it. The Minister will no doubt rush to assure the Committee that that is not the Government's intention. Will he explain why no government departments are included in the list? I beg to move.

The Earl of Northesk: From the Bill's drafting, it is unclear to what extent it is intended that the code of practice will deal with the raw data from which statistics are derived. I could infer from our earlier debate on the amendment of my noble friend Lord Jenkin that the Government expect that the code will deal with that. Notwithstanding that, I would welcome clarification from the Minister. It will come as no surprise that I believe that the matter should be covered, not least because, as I indicated previously, the Bill envisages granting the Statistics Board access to broad swatches of administrative data that will qualify as sensitive and/or personal under the Data Protection Act. In those circumstances, it would be wholly appropriate for the code to be prepared and revised to reflect the expertise and advice offered by the Information Commissioner. I beg to move.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: This amendment, like the previous one, would require the board to consult the Information Commissioner when preparing or revising the code of practice. As I explained in relation to the proposal to add a requirement for the board to consult the Treasury and Cabinet Office during the preparation and revision of the code of practice, we fully expect, as we set out in the Explanatory Notes, that the board will consult widely across government, as well as with a wide range of other bodies with relevant experience and interest. Similarly, the Government fully expect the board to consult the Information Commissioner when drawing up the code. However, as I have said previously, we do not intend to stipulate specific organisations on the face of the legislation. At the risk of repeating myself, we think it best to leave it to the independent board, which is composed of those with a range of expertise and backgrounds to ensure that it conducts an effective consultation on the code. As with the Treasury andthe Cabinet Office, I should say that it would be almost inconceivable for the code of practice to be drawn up without the Information Commissioner being consulted.

Lord Newby: moved Amendment No. 75:
	Clause 11, page 6, line 4, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 76 and 77 not moved.]
	Clause 11, as amended, negatived.
	Clause 12 [Assessment]:
	[Amendments Nos. 78 to 86 not moved.]
	Clause 12 agreed to.
	Clause 13 [Re-assessment]:
	[Amendments Nos. 87 to 89 not moved.]
	Clause 13 agreed to.
	Clauses 14 and 15 agreed to.
	Clause 16 [List of National Statistics]:
	[Amendments Nos. 90 to 92 not moved.]
	Clauses 16 agreed to.
	Clause 17 [Code: transitional]:

Lord Howard of Rising: moved AmendmentNo. 103:
	Clause 19, page 9, line 4, at end insert—
	"( ) If the Board is prevented from making a change to the Retail Price Index because the Chancellor of Exchequer has withheld his consent under subsection (3), it shall report that fact publicly."

Lord Jenkin of Roding: When the issue arose in another place, as my noble friend has just described, I recognised that I was not familiar with "hedonic regression". I therefore asked the Library here if it could make me a report, which it did. It was a good quarter of an inch thick and contained a huge amount of material, which sat on my desk for a number of weeks before I felt that I no longer had any room for it. It is a hugely complex concept that can affect the measurement of both the retail prices index and the consumer prices index, and I should think that it is one of those things that very few people, apart from the noble Lord, Lord Moser, and others who are and have been deeply involved in statistics, understand anything about. I must say that, despite the evidence that the Library was able to give me, I am still not much the wiser. However, I accept and reinforce the point that my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising has made that, if the Chancellor is going to withhold consent from a change that the board feel is necessary to measure the RPI, that should be transparent and should therefore be reported. I hope that the Government will see the sense of that and be able to accept the amendment.

Lord Lea of Crondall: I do not know how far my noble friend will have been briefed on the whole history of the RPI, but I was a member of the Retail Prices Index Advisory Committee for many years. There were frequent changes as new products came on the market—there were changes certainly every few meetings—and I do not recall the Treasury vetoing any of them. But what did happen—it was a memorable moment—was that when the RPI Advisory Committee had a debate about housing costs, we made a decision that mortgage interest rates should be retained within the RPI. The Treasury did not so much reject the advice—it was not in a position to do so—but decided to go in the direction of RPI minus X and sell that to the City of London. Will my noble friend take account of that variation on the theme? The down side is that it has led to a proliferation of indices. When we take the international dimension into account, there are now three indices when one counts RPI minus X, and the CPI, which is used internationally. I am a bit doubtful about whether the position is as simple as the Bill or the amendment imply.

Lord Northbrook: I support the amendment.Clause 19 refers solely to the retail prices index. Am I getting hold of the wrong end of the stick or do we need to have a similar form of protection for the consumer prices index if the board is prevented from making a change to that index because the Chancellor has withheld his consent under subsection (3)? Should the amendment be extended to cover that circumstance?

Lord Davies of Oldham: I hope that I will not have to engage with my noble friends Lord Lea and Lord Desai on the broader issues of the RPI, and not even with the noble Lord, Lord Oakeshott, because things are difficult enough on the narrow focus I have before me, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, indicated. The intention behind this provision is to deal with a highly specific circumstance, one that can be justified on the basis that it relates to the UK debt market and certain holdings of gilts. The holders have the right to redeem their gilts if the RPI changes in certain circumstances. If it did so when these gilts were below par, the implications for the nation's finances would be very considerable. We are talking about significant sums of money which relate to what are fortunately time-limited gilts, so I can say that this applies only to the year 2030 so far as this provision is concerned. However, we are reflecting here a highly sensitive change in the RPI which would trigger certain market consequences.
	What is being sought, therefore, is that the consent of the Chancellor would be required only under these narrow and specifically defined circumstances. It will be required when the Bank has determined that the proposed changes to the RPI are likely to triggerthe clause in relation to gilt-edged securities. Should the Bank determine that the change is not both fundamental and materially detrimental to the holders of index-linked gilts, the Chancellor will play no part in the proposed change. It is very restricted and is set against the background of the nation's financial needs—not just potential costs on the financial markets, but real fiscal costs because it is likely that the new gilts would need to be issued at higher yields if those they were replacing were redeemed at high yields. That could lead to substantial additional fiscal costs.
	We do not expect the Chancellor's role to be triggered very often. Since 1997, the Bank of England has not assessed any of the changes as being both fundamental and materially detrimental to the holders of the relevant index-linked gilts. Accordingly, if this provision had been in place over the past decade, the Chancellor's role under this clause would never have been activated. While of course I respect the well motivated representations on transparency and openness made by noble Lords, as well as a certain anxiety about the role of the Chancellor in this sensitive area, I assure them that this provision is narrowly defined, highly specific and in the national interest. That is why we have included it in the Bill.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: I hope that I shall be able to reassure the noble Earl on his genuine concern. The amendment relates to the board's function in Clause 20 of providing statistical services to any person in any place within or outside the United Kingdom. It might be helpful if I first say just a little about what we envisage by statistical services provided under Clause 20. This power is intended to allow the board to provide the range of services which the ONS provides currently.
	The ONS undertakes services which include providing information and advice on the production of statistics, including to Governments in other countries developing their statistical infrastructure. For example, the ONS supports statistical capacity building in Ukraine; and undertakes a range of surveys, such as the English House Condition Survey that the ONS carries out for the Department for Communities and Local Government or the "omnibus" survey, which allows government departments or agencies that conduct work with a direct policy purpose to commission a few questions in a survey, providing a fast, cost-effective and reliable way for organisations conducting work in the public interest to obtain information. I think that the noble Lord accepts that there is necessary adaptation in some of the statistics which are provided.
	Amendment No. 105, a probing amendment,seeks to prohibit the board from "adapting and developing" data under this function. However, in the course of carrying out statistical services, the board may be required to adapt or develop, and not just collect, data. Adapting of data is a significant part of any useful data-processing service the board is likely to provide and as such this should be retained.
	At present, for example, the DTI undertakes surveys on construction, selecting businesses from its register of construction businesses as the sample frame. The DTI passes this list of businesses to ONS, where ONS adapts these data using information in its own business registers. For example, the ONS would add records of new construction businesses discovered through its own surveys of business or would inform the DTI that a business on the DTI's register is no longer trading in construction. The adapted data are returned to the DTI, thereby keeping its construction register in step with the main ONS business register. A service level agreement governs this service and a fee is charged.
	Given that such work is currently undertaken by the ONS, we think it appropriate that the clause makes it explicit that one example of statistical services that may be provided by the board is in adapting and developing data. This will not allow the board to become simply a conduit of information across government through Clause 44 as it is clear from Clause 44(9) that the regulation may be made only where disclosure is required by the board to carry out its function; and, furthermore, when disclosure is in the public interest. I hope that the noble Earl is satisfied with the explanation I have given.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: rose to ask Her Majesty's Government why civil justice costs must be recovered in their entirety from those who become suitors before the court.
	My Lords, this Question was first tabled by the learned Lord Ackner, who was a brave and consistent champion of the cause of justice in this House. When he died a year ago, I tabled it in my own name to draw attention to the Government's regressive policy on civil justice costs. Alas, I cannot match Lord Ackner's sarcastic wit or his legal authority. He might have recalled the Irish judge,Sir James Matthew, who said:
	"In England, justice is open to all—like the Ritz hotel".
	The debate is timely. The Government's botched plan to create a Ministry of Justice has given rise to well founded concerns on these Benches and within the senior judiciary about its financial, constitutional and management implications. As Lord Justice Thomas told the Constitution Committee yesterday, more safeguards are needed to ensure that the courts are properly funded and administered.
	The current DCA consultation on civil court fees provides a sharp focus for this debate. The Civil Justice Council has repeatedly criticised the Government's policy in this area. It has pointed out that:
	"Constant increases in court fees seriously threaten access to justice for those on low or modest incomes who do not qualify for fee exemption or remission, or for legal aid. This should not be seen as simply a book balancing exercise, but is a serious access to justice issue".
	In response to the last consultation in 2004, the council explained that the policy of full costs recovery is,
	"fundamentally at odds with the aim of securing access to justice".
	The right of access to justice is a fundamental constitutional right. Section 92 of the CourtsAct 2003 empowers the Lord Chancellor to prescribe civil court fees, with the consent of the Treasury. In doing so, it requires the Lord Chancellor to,
	"have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied".
	But that is too limited a safeguard and must be read and given effect in accordance with the broader common law and convention right of access to justice.
	What is objectionable is not the principle of levying reasonable court fees. The objection is to a levy that is disproportionate and which impairs the effective enjoyment of the right of access to civil justice. The DCA's consultation paper was made in the Treasury and written by government accountants, using the language of the marketplace. In today's Whitehall, the citizen becomes a "customer", as though the litigant or "stakeholder" was merely seeking to buy butter or go to the cinema. The Civil Justice Council is rightly concerned at the short time allowed for the current consultation and that the consultation is too limited.
	As in 2004, the consultation paper takes it as axiomatic—which I think means beyond dispute or argument—first, that the civil courts will continue to charge fees for the entire cost of running the civil and family courts, because a free service would require the newborn justice ministry's expenditure to be increased by some £400 million; and, secondly, that general government fees and charging policy will continue to apply. It explains that this means that,
	"all services must have a financial objective agreed with the Treasury. The norm is full-cost recovery. But different objectives may be agreed where there is a wider policy justification. Fee remissions and exemptions (Remex) are an example of such a 'social subsidy'".
	It is characteristic of the Treasury's market-driven mind-set that it regards fee remissions and exemptions as a social subsidy, given by way of concession. It is a subsidy only in the sense that the taxpayer rather than the court user pays. The paper explains that the calculation of full-cost on which fees are based,
	"takes account ... of all resources needed to run the system. This includes the salaries of relevant HMCS staff and judiciary, general administrative costs including the cost of supporting IT systems, accommodation and an appropriate share of other HMCS overheads. It also includes the cost consequences of previous capital investment".
	Court fees are worth about £550 million and cover nearly 88 per cent of the full cost of running the civil and family courts. Currently, family court fees and magistrates' courts civil fees do not meet the full cost of fee exemptions and remissions. The DCA therefore proposes to increase fees accordingly. It explains that otherwise, to comply with the Treasury fees and charges guide, it would have to reduce spending, for example,
	"by closing courts or reducing staff numbers".
	That is a measure of the priorities of the Treasury in forcing the DCA to choose between closing courts and requiring suitors to pay for the full cost of running them, of paying judicial pensions, accommodating judges in heritage buildings and Victorian lodgings, court modernisation, and the burgeoning costs of investment in new technology.
	It is as inappropriate to charge the user for the entirety of these costs as it is to charge the patient for the costs of running the NHS. The core services of the state, whether policing, healthcare, the prison and immigration service, or the courts service should be mainly funded from general taxation. In the words of the Civil Justice Council, the policy,
	"fails to recognise the significant element of collective benefit in the administration of ... justice".
	We are told in the DCA paper that,
	"the requirement to fund most of the business from users' fees creates a strong onus to maximise efficiency".
	I hope that the Minister will explain to whose efficiency this refers and how a policy of charging users rather than taxpayers will create a strong onus on the part of the DCA and related public authorities to maximise efficiency. I should have thought the reverse to be the case. Why is it is fair and equitable for a claimant of moderate means to be required to pay court fees so as to "subsidise" the cost of judicial pensions and salaries, and maintain the judges' lodgings and heritage buildings?
	I have given notice to the DCA of four key questions that will, I hope, be answered in the Minister's reply. First, as a matter of principle, is it in the interests of justice to charge those seeking access to the courts the entire cost of running the courts, or, except for commercial and similar cases, should most of those costs be borne by general taxation in funding the courts service? Secondly, what has been the practical impact of the charging policy and its effect in impairing the effective enjoyment of the right of access to courts, especially taking into account the chilling effect of the costs rules, the impact of changes in civil legal aid and the decline in litigation? Thirdly, is the charging policy indirectly discriminatory in its adverse impact on vulnerable groups? Fourthly, would the Government's proposals to modify the charging scheme be sufficient to avoid arbitrary, discriminatory and unnecessary financial barriers impeding or deterring effective access to justice in civil cases?
	Significant levels of court fees risk deterring the citizen from using the civil justice system. Socially excluded groups are particularly vulnerable. The consultation paper fails to explain how it is objectively justifiable to maintain a policy that has a disproportionate adverse impact on vulnerable groups. Three years ago the Civil Justice Council called for a fundamental review of the exemption and remission provisions. That recommendation has not been accepted. Regrettably, it may once again be left to the courts to conduct a judicial review to secure an adequate guarantee of access to justice.
	I said that the debate was timely, but of course it is untimely, coming on the eve of the local government elections, which I fear explains why the Chamber is not crowded. Finally, I should say that I wrote to the Lord Chancellor urging him to reply to this debate since it concerns the DCA's consultation on a matter of constitutional importance, particularly affecting England and Wales. I have great respect for the Scottish legal system and for its law officers, including the Scottish Advocate-General. But I have to say that I find it a great curiosity that it should be left to the Scottish Advocate-General to have responsibility for replying to this debate.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I, too, lament the absence of Lord Ackner from this debate. I am quite sure he would have had some excoriating observations to make about the Government's policy.
	Like the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, I, too, am curious as to what prompted the Government to invite the Advocate-General to respond to this debate, bearing in mind the responsibilities that I understand he has. By saying that, I do not wish in any way to say that I am not delighted to see him on those Benches.
	As usual, the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has made a number of apposite observations and posed some demanding questions to the Government. I am simply going to continue in his slipstream. First, I want to ask the Government about the £34 million surplus that was a consequence of the recovery of charges levied on users of the civil courts by the Courts Service in the year ending 31 March 2006. This was the subject of a Written Question by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, which received a Written Answer on Tuesday, 9 January 2007. I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I read out the Answer from the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland. It is plain from her Answer that she accepts that it is undesirable that the system should generate a surplus.
	"The Treasury has agreed that the over-recovery of£34 million can be phased out over the Comprehensive Spending Review 2007 period. Therefore, Her Majesty's Courts Service proposes to use the increased income generated to fund: progressive reductions in the civil over-recovery; the additional cost of the proposed reforms in the remission and exemption policy; and any planned increases in resource spending on IT modernisation. Within civil proceedings, we are proposing to introduce hearing fees in the High Court and county court and other changes so that fees better match cost drivers. We are also proposing to make the appropriate reductions to offset extra income from hearing fees and to eliminate the over-recovery. This would be targeted on issue fees and weighted towards the fees for using e-channels (County Court Bulk Centre, Money Claim OnLine and Possession Claim OnLine), reflecting the lower cost compared with paper issue and the objective of promoting their greater use as part of the Her Majesty's Courts Service's business strategy".—[Official Report, 9/1/07; cols. WA 67-68.]
	Quite frankly, I have some difficulty in understanding exactly what the noble Baroness means. Will the Minister be kind enough to interpret this Answer in a way that makes it clear what measures will contribute to the phasing out of the surplus, and what relative contributions each one will make to the total?
	My second question concerns the Government's policy to recover in total, as I understand it, the cost of providing court services. What do they think it appropriate to include in defining "cost"? We have already heard the noble Lord, Lord Lester, make some important observations about capital costs. To what extent do the Government think it appropriate to charge capital costs on the sort of capital expenditure to which the noble Lord referred?
	My third question concerns the important contribution the Civil Justice Council is making to this debate. What weight do the Government give to principles that compete with the principle of recovering the total cost of the provision of court services? Recently the Civil Justice Council made the following observation:
	"The Council considers that the policy of recovering almost the full cost of running the civil justice system from litigants is wrong in principle in that it fails to recognise the significant element of collective benefit in the administration of civil justice, not least for those who do not become involved in proceedings. It is in the collective interest that an efficient and authoritative means for resolving dispute should exist, that the law should be clarified and developed, that the power of the executive should be checked, and that human rights should be safeguarded".
	My final question is to endorse and amplify the point the noble Lord, Lord Lester, made about access to justice. This ought to be a crucial component of the Government's approach to this issue. Have the Government undertaken an analysis of the impact of their approach on access to justice? Furthermore, has a view been taken about the combined impact of the approach together with recent changes in legal aid rules? I emphasise a further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, because I regard it as very important: what impact has the Government's policy had on socially excluded groups? I underline what a debt the House owes to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, for bringing this matter to its attention. We are all fortunate that he keeps his eye on a whole range of issues connected with access to justice, of which this is just one.

Lord Davidson of Glen Clova: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, for raising this debate, although I think I detect that he disagrees with the policy of full-cost recovery. This is an issue with a long history, as he knows better than many. True it is that, were Lord Ackner present today, I would no doubt be on the receiving end of two fairly acerbic observations. To some extent I am relieved I am not, but I regret that he is not with us because he was a very considerable legal figure.
	The primary benefit of civil litigation is usually that the parties involved are those who receive the benefit, and that is perhaps the critical area of distinction between the approaches to the principle here. The Government believe it is right that those who take the primary benefit bear the costs of using the civil courts. The general policy of recovering most of the cost through fees enables better targeting of scarce public resources.
	There are essentially three options for funding the civil court system. The first is to maintain the concept of setting fees to reflect cost, so those who have sufficient means to pay the full costs of litigation do so while the taxpayers' contribution is focused on those qualifying for remission or exemption. The second is to subsidise the level of court fees generally by increasing taxes or taking money from, say, the legal aid budget in order to reduce court fees. It should be borne in mind that a wholly free court service would cost some £550 million. That figure has already been alluded to. Inevitably, the third option is to cut costs and therefore fees by slashing court services, closing courts and sacking staff, which, of course, no one would want.
	Court fees have to comply with the general policy principles that apply to all services where the Government charge fees authorised by Parliament. The most important is that fees should not exceed the total cost of providing the service. Fees cannot be set to make a profit. All fee-charging services must have a financial objective agreed with the Treasury. For civil court fees, the objective is to recover the total cost, not counting the cost of providing fee exemptions and remissions. In other words, although the term is often used, the target is not full-cost recovery. A better way of describing the policy is full-cost pricing. This means that fees should generally be set at levels which, on average, if charged in every case rather than waived, would recover the full cost of providing the service.
	Full-cost pricing, together with a system of concessions to protect the least well-off, is the better way of targeting the taxpayer's contribution at where it is most needed. Furthermore, many fees in family proceedings are currently set at levels well below full cost. These include, in particular, the fees for domestic violence, adoption and public law childcare cases. So the taxpayer makes, and will continue to make, a significant contribution to the cost of running the civil and family courts. In 2005-06, court fees represented 79 per cent of the total cost.
	The part of cost not covered by fees is met by the general taxpayer as part of the resource budget ofthe Department for Constitutional Affairs. The taxpayer's contribution is made up of two elements: potential fee income forgone under the system of remissions and exemptions; and fees set below full-cost levels—that is, they would not cover the total cost even if none was remitted. This is currently the case with many fees for family proceedings generally and for civil proceedings in the magistrates' courts.
	In 2005-06, the latter subsidy was partly offset by the fact that civil fees in the county courts and above recorded significantly more than the cost of these proceedings. As the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, observed, the over-recovery for that year came to some £34 million. That arose partly from the difference between forecasts made in June 2005 and the actual outturn and partly as a result of the new costing model identifying a more accurate allocation of cost between services. The Treasury agreed that the over-recovery can be phased out over the spending review period of 2007.
	I was asked how the figures in the fees-and-charges approach will be dealt with. As I understand it, these figures are based on actual income and expenditure with shared and overhead costs allocated between services on the basis of the new model. The allocation would be through civil, family and probate. The recent fee increases were based on forecast income and expenditure using the old model. These figures showed a substantial over-recovery using full cost for civil and probate but lower recovery rates than intended on the other services. Civil fee income in the higher courts exceeded full cost by 15 per cent of an excess net income worth around £34 million. The probate recovery was 30 per cent—an excess of almost £4 million. The equivalent surpluses in 2006-07 are likely to be rather larger because of the full-year effect of the recent fee increases and the impact on civil and probate costs of the expenditure cuts. The recent increases are not the principal reason for the over-recovery; they were set to raise about£4 million in 2005-06—about 11 per cent of the process.
	We have developed a package of fee measures for implementation in August 2007, which, among other things, addresses the recovery issue. In other words, reductions in civil and probate should be offset by increases elsewhere so that we avoid over-recovery and have a neutral or better impact on the net departmental expenditure limit. We envisage that the August 2007 package will also include changes arising from the exemption and remission and fee structure reviews mentioned above. The former is likely to increase the loss of income that will have to be recovered through the departmental budget.
	I should say something in this context regarding access to justice via exemption and the remission process. Approximately 5 million people are in receipt of specified means-tested benefits or tax credits who are eligible for automatic exemption from court fees. Thus anyone not qualifying for exemption but who would suffer financial hardship if required to pay fees whether in full or in part may be granted remission in full or in part. The current test for remission is based on both income and expenditure and takes full account of all a person's commitments and liabilities, not just how much money they have or receive. Setting fees generally at levels lower than a full-cost price would mean that corporations and other wealthy litigants would benefit from the taxpayer's contribution, increasing its cost and in turn putting pressure on other budgets such as legal aid. These are public expenditure decisions for the Government; what the state provides free or at a charge is essentially a matter of policy for government. The issue of determining priorities in the allocation of scarce public resources inevitably arises. We recognise, of course, that citizens in a democracy under the rule of law have a constitutional right of access to a court system, but—this is the critical point—it is not a constitutional right to free access, provided those who cannot pay are protected.
	The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, raised the question of the practical impact of the charging policy. The department has no evidence to suggest that charging court fees is affecting the number of cases coming to court. One should bear in mind that court fees represent a much smaller proportion of the cost of civil litigation than legal fees. One must note that legal aid, together with a system of concessions, exists to protect access to justice for the less well-off.
	Current statistics show that the number of specified debt claims has steadily increased by 28 per cent since 2002, which suggests that there is no chilling effect on litigation proceeding in this area. However, as part of the long-term fee strategy, the department has commissioned a detailed piece of research to identify the consequences of fee charging. This may provide an answer to the question—I believe that it was his fourth—asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland. The research hopes to identify what the impact of fee changes might be on users and to identify any users who may be prevented from accessing the courts due to increases. The outcome of the research will be formally published in July 2007.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: I shall say two things. First, I will go back to the point that this is a non-executive board composed of people with experience in other fields, who have a certain independence and who are not in the business of doing anything other than what the Government's intend the board should do. Secondly, all the board's functions are statistical; anything it does must be in line with that basic premise. There is little for the noble Baroness to worry about.

Lord Howard of Rising: moved AmendmentNo. 116:
	Clause 25, page 10, line 25, at end insert—
	"( ) The report under subsection (1) shall include an appraisal of the discharge of the Board's duties under section 26."

Lord Davies of Oldham: Clause 26 obliges the board to have regard to efficiency and cost-effectiveness when deciding on the exercise of its functions, and to limit the costs that individuals, businesses and other organisations bear as a result of its activities; for example, when requiring them to fill in a survey. ONS has a long history of working to minimise the survey burden on respondents. It is right that this valuable work continues and that the board builds on this in assessing the burden that it places on others for the necessary supply of information.
	I do not think that it necessary to have an explicit requirement that the board should report on this one particular aspect of its functions. After all, the board has a wide range of functions and its job is to present a report to Parliament on how it fulfils its obligations. If it was clear that the board was failing in the respect to which the noble Lord draws attention, there is no doubt that that report would be subject to criticism.
	We have got the board properly accountable for its work. It has a range of functions; it would be invidious to single out one function on which we laid legislative emphasis. I hope that the noble Lord will recognise that we also have precedent in how the ONS goes about its work. The board will inherit some working practices germane to its operations which have stood the statistical service in good stead.

Lord Howard of Rising: I thank the Minister. The board has not a function but a duty. There cannot be much wrong with asking the board to report on its efficiency at the same time as the many other things that it is obliged to report on. If the board does this at least how it is getting on, what it is doing and how it is managing its business will be able to be examined.In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: As we have heard, Amendment No. 169 would require the board to establish a committee consisting of non-executive members of the board, to keep under review whether the board's internal financial controls secure the proper conduct of its financial affairs. Amendment No. 117 would ensure that the board's annual report included a report of the work of the committee.
	The Government believe that corporate governance is of fundamental importance. Good corporate governance includes embedding effective risk management at all levels of the management of government organisations, increasing the need for explicit assurance about risk, control and governance in organisations. As the noble Baroness knows, the work of audit committees is a key part of that.
	To promote good practice across government,the Treasury publishes Corporate Governance in Central Government Departments: Code of Good Practice. The code contains as one of its basic principles that,
	"the board should ensure that effective arrangements are in place to provide assurance on risk management, governance and internal control. In this respect, the board should be independently advised by an audit committee chaired by an independent non-executive member".
	The corporate governance code also sets out that audit committees should be established by and function in accordance with the Audit Committee Handbook, another Treasury publication.
	Clause 32 empowers the board to establish committees to exercise its functions, give it advice, and support it in transacting its business. However, rightly, it does not specify the names and functions of specific committees that must be established. The Government fully expect that the board will use that power to establish an independent and objective audit committee, chaired by an independent non-executive member, as set out in the code on corporate governance and following the guidance set out in the Audit Committee Handbook.
	In addition, the Government expect Parliament to play the central role in holding the statistical system to account. There will be full accountability to Parliament as much for this aspect of the board's work as for others. For example, in the extremely unlikely event that the board failed to establish an audit committee, I have no doubt that that would be a matter of fundamental concern to Parliament and it would call the board to account for that failure.
	In those circumstances, we do not think it necessary to legislate for an audit committee. It is for the independent board to determine how it sets up its committees, including the details of their membership, and it is not appropriate to stipulate so much detail in the Bill. The board will be expected to follow best practice guidance, but it would not be appropriate to put that in legislation.
	As I have said in previous debates, we do not think it necessary to stipulate the contents of the board's annual report. Clause 25 already requires the board's annual report to cover what it has done and what it has found each year, and within that remit, we think we should allow the board to use its own judgment, following good practice guidance, to ensure that the most pertinent information about its activities are reported each year. I hope my explanation is satisfactory to the noble Baroness.

Lord Howard of Rising: moved AmendmentNo. 118:
	Clause 25, page 10, line 27, at beginning insert "both Houses of"

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: These amendments relate to the board's duties to prepare reports. The reports under Clause 25 are reports primarily to Parliament and, where relevant, the devolved legislatures, although of course the reports published under this clause will also be published and made widely available. The reports are particularly important given Parliament's central accountability role, and should be one of the main mechanisms by which Parliament might hold the statistical system to account.
	The annual report under Clause 25 should include the board's forward work plans, including that of the executive office of the National Statistician and—as with the annual reports produced by all departments—the board's audited annual accounts. Although we strongly hope that Parliament will play an active scrutiny role throughout the year, and not just once a year at the point of the publication of the board's annual report, the annual reporting system will help Parliament to assess whether the board is effectively and efficiently discharging its duties.
	Reports under Clause 25 will allow the board to inform Parliament about: the advice and guidance it has provided to others, including Ministers of the Crown and Ministers in the devolved Administrations, under other duties and powers it has in the Bill; the response it has received from those to whom it has provided that advice; and its views on the adequacy of the response where appropriate.
	Amendments Nos. 118 and 119 would put an explicit requirement on the board to lay its reports beforeboth Houses of Parliament. This is unnecessary.Section 1(1) of the Laying of Documents before Parliament (Interpretation) Act 1948 already provides that a reference in any Act to the laying of any instrument, report, account or other document before Parliament is to be construed as a reference to the laying of the document before each House of Parliament, unless the contrary intention is stipulated. The reference to Parliament in Clause 26 therefore will ensure that reports will be laid before each House, without the need for further elaboration. I hope that the noble Lord is reassured by that answer.

Lord Lea of Crondall: moved AmendmentNo. 124A:
	After Clause 26, insert the following new Clause—
	"Location
	(1) The Board may locate its statistical activities in any place within the United Kingdom which it thinks necessary or expedient for the exercise of its functions.
	(2) In choosing a location or locations under subsection (1) the Board must take into account the need to—
	(a) recruit and retain suitably skilled and experienced employees;(b) maintain effective contacts with users of statistics, in particular within central government; and(c) maintain the influence of official statistics on policy."

Lord Lea of Crondall: The Government should be able to accept Amendment No. 124A. First, it would affirm that the board may locate its statistical activities in any place in the UK if it thinks it necessary or expedient for the exercise of its functions. I affirm the importance of spreading public services, including Civil Service work, around Britain, and I have been involved in a good number of such exercises. However, a certain finesse is needed where the function is by its nature a central Whitehall function; hence the three factors in the amendment which we say the board must take into account: first, the need to recruit and retain suitably skilled and experienced employees; secondly, the need to maintain effective contacts with users of statistics, particularly in central government; and, thirdly, the need to maintain the influence of official statistics on policy.
	In making the case, I am relying substantially on a briefing from the Association of First Division Civil Servants—the FDA—which is the union for senior civil servants. It is a TUC affiliate, so I am told that I should declare an interest in that FDA members also help to pay my pension. The central issue raised by the amendment relates to the location of the ONS and whether the board will have a coherent job of work to do. If the determination of the location of ONS staff is excluded—if, for example, the board is precluded from deciding that the national accounts section must be at the heart of Whitehall—I fear that the standing and reputation of the board will be negligible from the start.
	An ONS-commissioned survey of 2006 on the business case for ONS relocation from 2008 onwards states on page 7:
	"Looking beyond March 2008 the Government's plans to convert the statistical side of ONS to become a non ministerial department reporting to an independent governing board ... These organisational changes will have little or no impact on the ONS relocation programme ... however any decision taken after the conversion will be the responsibility of the independent governing board".
	That raises two important questions: one about reversibility; the other about responsibility. The survey also states:
	"There is some reluctance on behalf of the National Accounts Group and the Methodologists to embrace the proposed change to re-locate outside of London and they hold strong views on the likely risks to the business if this change is adopted. Their concerns are mainly around the ability to retain existing staff and recruit new, suitably qualified and experienced staff outside of the London area. This may have an impact on the quality of statistical output in relationships with key customers and stakeholders".
	I submit that it must be part of the board's scope to conclude, if it so wishes, that the current move to take all ONS activities out of London, mainly to Newport, has caused a loss of morale and efficiency. The survey's figures on senior civil servants are quite astounding—I shall give them in a moment. All colleagues who have taken part in these debates will have seen the FDA's evidence to the Treasury Select Committee to which I am referring. The FDA points out that it is not simply making a trade union point, by any manner of means; it is expressing deep dismay at the impact on professional standards. It points out that no other country in Europe, with the exception of Germany, which has a highly federal structure, has a significant national statistical office presence in its capital city. Moreover, the demotion of ONS is not just from the outskirts of London, but from what we have always known as the Treasury building just across the road. We all know that in whatever walk of life we come from, access to and location close to the highest level correlates with the degree to which our function is taken seriously. If, in effect, none of the functions of the staff of the ONS is located in Whitehall, it looks a bit like a circus animal. The ONS will have a small presence here just to serve the board, with everyone else somewhere else.
	The other point made is that the Newport labour market is not going to produce the specialist skills required to draw up, for example, the national accounts. The FDA concludes as follows:
	"The FDA believes that the ONS is at crisis point. The cumulative impact of the need to deliver efficiency savings, the requirement to locate many key areas of work away from London and poor management of people and processes is putting the future delivery of the ONS's outputs at risk".
	I shall mention two of the survey results. Only 11 per cent of ONS senior civil servants think that the organisation is well managed, which is 40 percentage points lower than for the Civil Service as a whole. The second result is that 11 per cent of ONS senior civil servants think change is well managed in the organisation, which is 22 percentage points lower than for the Civil Service overall.
	I have some sympathy with an observation that could be made: this is most unfair on the senior managers of the ONS. I think it is most unfair, but I have quoted the facts. It is most unfair that they are the people carrying the can in these circumstances—we have all been there and got the T-shirt—and have to take all the opprobrium of such a relocation.
	I want to put on the record my personal thanks to the director of ONS for her courtesy and ready agreement to arrange for a senior colleague from Newport to come to the House of Lords and discuss with me over a cup of tea some factual questions concerning statistics on income distribution and how the £30 billion or £40 billion paid out in City bonuses fit into the published data based on averages for all employment pay increases widely quoted in inflation analyses, or excluded as the case may be. This is against a background where the board, if it is to have any authority, needs to have the whip hand over the Treasury on the publication of statistics on things like income distribution, not the other way around. Is that sort of signal being sent at this point in time? The answer to that question, in the vernacular, is "You must be joking". The ONS seems to have been set efficiency targets by Gershon, on top of Lyons, so hence the relocation targets. But I have to say that if anyone were to define cost cutting as synonymous with efficiency, we would call it a caricature.
	To recapitulate: first, after these changes, will there continue to be a significant London presence? I think the answer is no. Some 700 ONS staff are still here at the moment, but they will virtually disappear. Secondly, will it be possible to get staff with the specialist skills needed if London is closed down?The answer, I submit, is no. Thirdly, will there be a significant loss of experience through people resigning? The answer to that is yes. Fourthly, was there or is there still room for a compromise, such as keeping national accounts in London? That was rejected out of hand, so everybody will go. I do not see why that proposition has to be rejected out of hand.
	My noble friend should be able to find a way to show ONS staff some light at the end of the tunnel—and I do not mean just the light at the end of the Severn Tunnel on the Great Western Railway. The location changes must not be set in concrete before the board gets to work. An assurance is needed that if—I believe when—the board concludes that the comprehensive nature of the relocation has gone over the top and that it is damaging the quality of national statistics, the board will be able to make the necessary adjustments. So the changes cannot be set in concrete and some may need to be reversed, as the Irish found—it is mentioned in the FDA memorandum— when they initially moved all their parallel functions from Dublin to Cork. I shall consider carefully what the Minister has to say. I beg to move.

Lord Newby: I am grateful to the noble Lordfor bringing forward this amendment. At Second Reading and in Committee last week I raised the issue which he has raised in greater detail today. Since last week I have had a chance to read for the first time the FDA evidence to the Treasury Select Committee. That is the most damning document one could read of a decision to relocate any department anywhere in the UK given that one is talking about the FDA. It is not the miners' union led by Arthur Scargill. One has to take what it says extremely seriously.
	As a matter of principle, we on these Benches have been great supporters of relocation. Indeed, my noble friend in another place, Dr Cable, has argued thatthe whole Treasury should move to Liverpool—a suggestion of which the Treasury has not approved with the alacrity with which it is forcing people from ONS to go down to south Wales. But there comes a point where, however much one might favour the principle of relocation, the cost and benefits weigh the other way. It seems to me that in respect of certain of the functions of the ONS, as the noble Lord, Lord Lea, explained, the argument for moving to Newport has not been made.
	Last week I referred to information which had been passed to me from someone who currently works for the ONS. It was claimed that, as of a fortnight ago, of the division which produces the RPI and the CPI—it has a staff of 35—not one of them had chosen to relocate to Newport and that there were serious risks to the production of those statistics over the coming months. Does the Minister recognise those figures and that danger? What action will the Treasury take if it believes that there is a serious risk that major statistical series will be disrupted if the move, as currently planned, goes ahead?
	As regards the role and powers of the board, if the amendment were passed, to reverse the changes, I fear that that could be extremely difficult unless it were possible to relocate back at a cost saving. As wehave heard from the Minister, a five-year financial settlement has been agreed with the ONS which is predicated on the move to Newport being successfully concluded, with the reductions in costs that that brings with it.
	While I support the amendment and the sentiments underlying it, unless the Minister is about to tell me that the settlement can be re-opened, I have some doubts that it is a reversible situation.

Viscount Eccles: Perhaps I may briefly refer to cultural change. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, raised this issue at Second Reading and I referred to the29 targets that the Office for National Statistics is bidden to meet. The noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall, has thrashed out the bare bones of what we were asking at Second Reading. We have not had any answers to those worries. I referred earlier today to whether it is possible for the Statistics Board to hit the ground running. I simply do not believe that it is. I feel very strongly about the combination of where the Office for National Statistics is coming from, the regime under which it has been controlled to date and what is expected to happen with all this independence and rebuilding of public trust as the objective. Quite frankly, it will not happen unless someone takes a serious look at this Bill and makes many important changes between now and Third Reading.

Lord Davies of Oldham: I am grateful to my noble friend for this amendment, which has triggered an interesting and important debate. We are in transition at present and, in terms of any form of any cost-benefit analysis, rather more of the costs are obvious than the benefits which accrue. I want to put in context the Government's policy on relocating activity outside London and the south-east. It developed followingSir Michael Lyons' independent review of relocation, published three years ago, which argued that government was located too much in London and the south-east, to the detriment of other nations and regions within the UK. The Government welcomed thatreport.
	The Lyons review argued that relocation offers value-for-money gains, with departments able to take advantage of significantly lower rents and potentially lower labour costs in other regions by aligning pay with local labour market conditions. Unnecessarily locating Government activities in the most expensive part of the UK does not make sense. I ask whether anyone quarrels with those important propositions. Relocating posts out of London also increases opportunities in other parts of the UK, such as allowing people from other locations to join the Civil Service. Relocation delivers economic benefits for an area by creating valuable jobs. New locations can be a spur for new ways of working, adopting better business practices, processes and technology, and reforming organisational culture. That is why the Government are making steady progress across departments in terms of relocation. The Ministry of Defence has moved 1,900 posts, the Home Office is moving 1,300 posts and the Department for Work and Pensions is moving 3,900. They are not just operational posts; policy work is also moving. For example, DfID has moved various policy teams from London to Scotland. Specialist work is also being moved: 150 posts in the Department of Health and a former NHS information service have migrated from offices in London and the south-east to Leeds.
	The ONS has a part to play in this wider strategy. It is relocating jobs out of London. I might add that accommodation costs are five times higher in London than they are in Newport, where most of the relocation is going. In circumstances where we all recognise the burden of London housing costs when it comes to the question of recruitment, the advantages that Newport offers will be recognised. This gives the ONS an opportunity to create a new structure, which will affect efficiency savings.
	I recognise that my noble friend has rightly identified the concerns of the FDA about the dislocation caused by the move. Of course there are concerns at this stage, and it is important that the ONS responds to them. That is why there are significant relocation packages to encourage staff to relocate to south Wales and to provide support and additional training for them. It is recognised that asking staff to do this involves a degree of sacrifice on their part. But these are issues that the FDA and the other unions involved are well equipped to deal with, with regard to managers. I recognise what my noble friend is indicating; namely, that there is some dislocation that is causing anxiety at this stage. These issues need to be addressed, but my noble friend will also recognise that the current process is at probably its most stressful position.
	I might add that Newport is not the end of the world, certainly not for statisticians. There is a significant ONS office already in Newport, so we are asking people to relocate not to a new site but to a well established office with much statistical expertise already in place. I recognise the commonsense point that my noble friend expressed so graphically, that the closer one is to key policy-makers, the louder one's voice may be—or one thinks that it is—and that one does not need such a loud voice when one can whisper around the corner rather than calling from afar. That is a matter to take on board. The board will have to take responsibility for ensuring that this relocation does not adversely affect the quality of its work. But there is no evidence that that has been the case in other departments, and I see no reason for thinking that ONS managers will be any less successful than the Department of Health, for example, has been in moving its specialist workers.
	However, the concerns need to be met. I would be more concerned if my noble friend had had neither sight nor sound of any comment from organisations representing the workforce involved. Far from that being the case, he said that a great deal of activity is being carried out by the First Division Association, which is not a negligible influence on the Government or the Civil Service. I am fully aware of the anxieties that my noble friend expressed, but we are at the most difficult point in the process and machinery is in place to meet the difficulties that have arisen.
	If the move to Newport were stopped, it would create a very difficult situation. The board would be unlikely to think that that was a judicious action to take. The ONS is fitting into a pattern followedby many government departments. Therefore, the problems associated with relocation are widely known throughout government, as are the benefits. I reiterate that many of the benefits accrue in the longer term. An ONS office exists in the relocation area. Staff will find housing costs in that area a good deal less expensive than they are elsewhere. That represents for many a real improvement in their cost of living although I accept that relocation costs apply in any move. That is why we have packages in place to address that.
	Concern has been expressed on all sides of the Committee about an aspect of policy that generally achieves widespread agreement; namely, that we should seek to spread government functions and Civil Service jobs more widely than has been the case in the past. However, there are always anxieties about the disruption incurred in that. Nevertheless, I have every confidence that the service will meet the requirements imposed on it by these changes. The Office for National Statistics—and, in due course, the board—needs to wrestle with anything that impacts directly on the success of its work. Neither the ONS nor the board would fulfil its duties if the relocation resulted in a deterioration in the work of our statisticians. I have no reason to believe that that will be the outcome, but I appreciate that the needs of the staff should be taken seriously. These are serious issues concerning a service that is of great importance to the nation. The ONS, and subsequently the board when the Bill becomes an Act, is obliged to ensure that this transition is effected in a way that allays the fears of my noble friend and all Members of the Committee who spoke about this issue.

Lord Lea of Crondall: I am afraid that I did not find that a very satisfactory answer. I hope that before Report my noble friend will ensure that there is very full consideration of the outstanding questions. He said that the board would not be doing its job properly if this move resulted in a deterioration in the work of statisticians. I am afraid that he contradicted himself by implying that there is no way in which this thing can be reversed. Government doctrine has to be reversed before Report.
	I thank all noble Lords for their helpful contributions. The central point that has been brought out and is now ready for drafting is that the board must have employment location as one of its central functions. In all areas of employment, that must be a central strategic function of senior management and strategic management; everyone knows that.
	The central fallacy in my noble friend's brief, which comes from the Treasury, is that it does not compare apples with apples. The first rule of statistics is that you must compare apples with apples. What my noble friend has done—he is a great friend of mine, so I can say this—is compare the minimal move of certain people out of the Ministry of Defence, or the agriculture department or whatever, with a lock, stock and barrel move of the ONS. That is not comparing apples with apples, and no self-respecting statistician would make such an error. Is the Bank of England going to move lock, stock and barrel? Of course not. The same goes for the Ministry of Defence.
	I beg my noble friend to look at the three criteria, which have been carefully drafted; they are not just done off the top of someone's head. The Treasury has not begun to deal with this remotely satisfactorily in the notes that it has prepared. As regards the FDA and the idea that things are over the hump and will get better, I am afraid that the FDA says that it could all get worse. I see no evidence to support the Panglossian view that the relocation has gone through the worst. I regret to say that I will have to table an amendment very much like this on Report, unless my noble friend can think of a way of meeting half way the very logical points that I have made. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Noakes: In moving Amendment No. 135, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 144 and to Clause 27 standing part, which are in the same group. Clause 27 creates the usual draconian power of direction which the Government reserve for public bodies. Our natural instinct is to oppose this power remaining in the Bill because it is the very antithesis of the independence that should be created by it. How can there be proper independence for the Statistics Board if it has to look over its shoulder the whole time to see whether it is upsetting the Government or the devolved Administrations? The Government have not made their case for this power to be established in the Bill, which is why we have opposed the Question that Clause 27 stand part of the Bill. The Explanatory Notes offer no specific assistance either. Why is the power needed and in what circumstances do the Government believe that the clause will be activated?
	The Bill refers to a "serious failure" by the board to comply with its objective or to perform any of its functions, but the judgment is that of one man: the Prime Minister, now that our earlier amendments have replaced the Chancellor. Let us suppose that the board had reached a judgment on the proper calculation of efficiency in the National Health Service that showed that the Government's policies were resulting in a massive waste in the NHS—noble Lords will recognise that this is not a fanciful example—or that the board decided that changes were needed to crime statistics which had the effect of showing the Government's achievements in a bad light. Again, this is not a fanciful example. What is to stop the Prime Minister stepping in and saying that he considers that the board has not complied with its objective in this regard? He might argue that it would not serve the public good if public trust in the NHS or in the police were so undermined by the new statistics that it would perhaps create social unrest.
	It is not only the Prime Minister who has this power, but also the devolved Administrations. They have the power to step in and exercise the functions of the board if the direction is not complied with. I believe that this is an unusual component of the conventional power of direction, which is why our Amendment No. 144 would delete subsection (12). What precedents exist for such a power—not the power of direction but of step-in? In what circumstances has such a power been used in practice?
	Clause 4 contains the usual, wide-ranging grounds for the removal of the chairman and the other non-executive members. Can the Minister envisage a situation where Clause 27 (12) could be invoked to allow the Government to step in and act, but where the provisions of Clause 4 did not allow the removal of the chairman and the non-executives? I remind the Minister that Clause 4 allows removal where a member is,
	"unable, unfit or unwilling to perform his functions".
	Why is that power not good enough to change the board? Why does there have to be a power of direction backed up by the power to step in as well? The Bill is weighted towards circumscribing the independence of the board. That is why we believe that if the power is to remain in the Bill, and especially if it is to include subsection (12), more parliamentary oversight is required.
	It is helpful that the direction is to be laid before Parliament, but that does not amount to a parliamentary process. Accordingly, Amendment No. 135 would require a direction to be made by order. This is a modest amendment, because it requires by virtue of Clause 62 only the negative resolution procedure, of which the Minister will be aware we are normally dismissive. The important point is that it would not impede the operation of an order, if it were ever determined that one were necessary and urgent, but it would allow a parliamentary debate if appropriate. That is an essential protection for the Statistics Board.
	Powers of direction are important not because they are often used—history shows that they are used rarely in the public sector—but because the threat of their use is a subtle, or even overt, bargaining counter between the holder and the object of the power. That secret weapon of control will be made less sinister if all parties know that Parliament will have a proper role if the power is used. I beg to move.

Lord Newby: On the face of it, the clause is pretty draconian. The definition of a "serious failure" could be pretty flexible. If the Minister believes that his colleagues here are always reasonable and sensible, perhaps he might contemplate the fact thatMr Salmond gets rather fed up with the Statistics Board producing statistics which inaccurately reflect the future of oil reserves in Scotland. The noble Baroness is therefore right to raise serious questions about the broad sweep of this clause.
	It would be helpful if the Minister gave us some idea of what the Government consider the kindof circumstances in which it might be invoked, particularly those in which the Government would not simultaneously invoke the earlier clauses about removing either the chair or non-executive directors. In many circumstances—relatively rare ones, I suspect—that would be the more logical way of doing it. If the Government's view is that they wish to retain the power, having to come to Parliament to do it would serve as a break on their willingness to do so, as noble Lords have said.

Lord Davies of Oldham: I assure the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, that the clause is as far removed from the day-to-day operations of the board as it is possible to get. The clause embraces the ultimate sanction against the board when there is a failure of such seriousness that the Chancellor acts. In acting, it is inconceivable that there would be no parliamentary response to such a dramatic development.
	The clause, which the noble Lord, Lord Newby, suggested was draconian, is actually less powerful in its impact upon the body as a final sanction than exists for the Food Standards Agency, where the Secretary of State can give such directions as he may consider appropriate for the purposes of remedying a serious failure. Similarly, Section 40 of the Environment Act empowers the Secretary of State to direct the Environment Agency on the implementation of any community obligations or international agreements. That is what this clause does in the event of such neglect on the part of the board of its obligations under a European directive. Far from having anything to do with the day-to-day operations of the board, it is the final sanction when there has clearly been a complete breakdown of understanding of what it is necessary for the board to do such as to trigger the Chancellor of the Exchequer's action. It is inconceivable that such an event would take place without the most widespread public debate and parliamentary response to it. We would be reflecting a very serious crisis in the operation of a board. Moreover, that board, more than the other bodies I referred to earlier, is recognised in terms of its independence and its performance—I refer to the individuals who have held the office of National Statistician and to the Office of National Statistics, which is due to be developed and subsumed into this board.
	I assure noble Lords as strongly as I possibly can that this is the ultimate fall-back position necessary for the Minister responsible for the overall operation of the board—the final sanction that he or she has in circumstances where there has been a significant dereliction of duty and failure. Such a failure, being massively in the public domain, would need to be open to reporting. It is inconceivable within that framework that there would not be the fullest parliamentary debate upon such an act. We are describing the position of crisis in the ultimate situation, where there is a breakdown.
	One or two noble Lords indicated that they hoped that this would never arise. It is highly unlikely that a body as responsible as this board would ever get into these circumstances, but there is a need for a failsafe mechanism for the Minister who is responsible for Parliament and to the people for the discharge of the functions of the board. Therefore, a reserve power is necessary. Otherwise, it must be contended, what is being suggested is that the board could get into a very serious circumstance indeed, without a Minister having any direct responsibility for putting things right.

On Question, Whether the said amendment(No. 135) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 23; Not-Contents, 27.